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ABSTRACT
Responding to the #MeToo Movement, companies across the United
States and Europe are beginning to offer products that use AI to detect
discrimination and harassment in digital communications. These companies
promise to outsource a large component of the EEO compliance function to
technology, preventing the financial costs of toxic behavior by using AI to
monitor communications and report anything deemed inappropriate to
employer representatives for investigation. Highlighting the problem of
underreporting of sexual harassment and positing that many victims do not
come forward out of a fear of retaliation, these “#MeTooBots” propose to
remove the human element from reporting and rely on AI to detect and report
unacceptable conduct before it contaminates the workplace.
This new technology raises numerous legal and ethical questions
relating to both the effectiveness of the technology and the ways in which it
alters the paradigm on which anti-discrimination and anti-harassment
doctrine is based. First, the notion that AI is capable of identifying and
parsing the nuances of human interactions is problematic as are the
implications for underrepresented groups if their linguistic styles are not
part of the AI’s training. More complicated, however, are the questions that
arise from the technology’s attempt to eliminate the human reporter: (1)
How does the use of AI to detect harassment impact employer liability and
available defenses since the doctrine has long been based on worker
reports? (2) How does this technology impact alleged victims’ vulnerability
to retaliation when incidents may be detected without a victim’s report? (3)
What is the impact on the power of victim voice and autonomy in this system?
and (4) What are the overall consequences for organizational culture when
this type of technology is employed?
This Article examines the use of AI in EEO compliance and considers
whether the elimination of human reporting requires a reconsideration of
the U.S.’s approach to discrimination and harassment. Appearing on the
heels of revelations about the use of non-disclosure agreements and
arbitration clauses to silence victims of sexual harassment, this Article posits
that the use of AI to detect and report improper communications, an
innovation that purports to help eradicate workplace harassment, may, in
reality, be problematic for employers and employees alike, including
functioning as a new form of victim abuse. Lastly, the Article considers the
difficult work of creating open, healthy workplace cultures that encourage
reporting, and the impact of outsourcing this work to Artificial Intelligence.
Rather than rejecting what may be an inevitable move towards incorporating
artificial intelligence solutions in the workplace, this Article suggests more
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productive uses of AI at work and adjustments to employment discrimination
doctrine to be better prepared for an AI-dependent world.
INTRODUCTION
In January 2020, The Guardian published a short article describing the
development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) solutions to the problem of sexual
harassment in the workplace.1 Referred to as “#MeTooBots,” the AI-infused
technology can reportedly “monitor and flag communications between
colleagues and [is] being introduced by companies around the world.”2 The
companies offering this technology explain its development as a response to
the staggering number of women who experience sexual harassment in the
workplace, the cost to employees, employers, and workplace culture overall,
and most importantly, the fact that sexual harassment is massively
underreported largely because victims fear retaliation if they report.3 As one
company explains:
By leveraging AI-infused technology, . . . organizations can
identify, investigate, and handle offensive communications in the
early stage -- without requiring the victim to report the incident to
a superior. With artificial intelligence in the workplace, the 75%
of sexual harassment cases that typically go unreported, can be
automatically identified. Armed with this technology,
organizations can protect employees, the company, and the culture
from malicious employees who would otherwise be toxic to the
workforce.4
This technology is under development by multiple companies but the
idea is generally the same — “the bot uses an algorithm trained to identify
potential bullying, including sexual harassment, in company documents,
emails and chat . . . with anything the AI reads as being potentially
problematic then sent to a lawyer or HR manager to investigate.”5 AI
scientists have voiced some skepticism, noting that the idea was promising
but perhaps limited in its current capabilities.6 These critiques center on the
1. Isabel Woodford, Rise of #MeTooBots: scientists develop AI to detect harassment in
emails, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 3, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/03
/metoobots-scientists-develop-ai-detect-harassment [https://perma.cc/23Z9-C53W].
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., AWARE, http://www.awarehq.com/blog/identifying-and-reducing-workplac
e-sexual-harassment-with-ai [https://perma.cc/JPC5-DRFU] (last visited May 18, 2021)
(describing the use of technology in identifying sexual harassment in the workplace).
4. Id.
5. Woodford, supra note 1.
6. Id.
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nuanced nature of human communication and the notion that AI is not yet
capable of understanding the subtleties and complexities inherent in
harassing language.7 Other critics focus on the privacy implications and the
“Big Brother” quality, arguing that it would be viewed by workers as
“another way [for employers] to control their employees.”8
One
commentator called this approach “an Orwellian misuse of AI,” expressing
particular concern for employees accused of harassment by the bot.9
The urge to simply write off this new technology as ineffective or
immature is a mistake as is the narrow critique that its essential ethical and
legal problems lie in privacy concerns or employer control. In fact,
#MeTooBots emerge from a workplace that is speeding towards
incorporation of AI in numerous forms and functions.10 The fact that the
technology may not be quite capable of the nuanced task it is being given
will likely be seen by some as a temporary problem and by others as no
problem at all. And the exclusive focus on privacy and the “big brother”
aspects of this technology misses key ethical and legal problems in its
adoption. As this Article describes, the embrace of #MeTooBots creates
unforeseen problems for the wrongly accused, the employer, and the victim.
Basic problems with the technology may end up exposing women and people
of color to unwarranted investigations, creating a more hostile workplace for
already marginalized employees. At the same time, use of AI as proposed
by the companies offering these tools may also open employers to
significantly increased legal liability. Lastly, assigning this function to AI
has the potential to expose victims of digital harassment to retaliation
without legal protection.11 Ironically, use of AI in this space is likely to have
the opposite of its intended effect. Rather than serving the purpose of
creating healthier workplace cultures by identifying unreported sexual
harassment, AI sexual harassment monitors would likely generate greater
distrust among employees and managers alike, subject victims of harassment
to lawful retaliation, and perhaps most profoundly, impact the functioning of
employment law doctrine in this area.
The use of AI in place of victim reporting is a monumental shift in the
expectations on which discrimination and harassment doctrine is based. It
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Norman Lewis, Opinion, #MeTooBots that will scan your personal emails for
‘harassment’ are an Orwellian misuse of AI, RT, (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.rt.com/op-ed/4
77393-metoobots-ai-orwellian-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/9SJ2-9VDW] (“Any risqué
joke, comment on appearance, proposal to go out for drinks, or even the stray mention of a
body part will probably be meticulously logged to be used against you at a future date.”).
10. See infra Part I. 7 (describing changes to a digital workplace).
11. See infra Parts III. 54 & 63 (discussing retaliation against employees).
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threatens to weaken victim voice and agency within the system. Even more
alarming, it has the potential to alter the basic premise on which Title VII
and its doctrine rests—that the law lays out basic prohibitions but relies on
victims or other human reporters to bring violations to the attention of
employers, regulators, and courts. In fact, the determination of employer
liability, the prohibition on retaliation in anti-discrimination laws, and the
role and function of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) are all based on the expectation that human reporters are integral to
the system.12 There are no discrimination police—the system is based on
people coming forward to report instances of unlawful discrimination and
the protection of those reporters. Were the technology and approach of
#MeTooBots to be adopted broadly, it would necessitate a rethinking of
employment discrimination doctrine, the role of victims and their agency in
a process that advances without their control, and how retaliation protection
should function in such a system.
This Article considers the use of AI in detecting and reporting sexual
harassment in the context of an overwhelming movement to incorporate
technology and AI in the workplace—in hiring, worker assessment and
tracking, and worker and workplace optimization.13 #MeTooBots are not a
one-off creation but rather one in a series of technological developments that
are quickly being normalized. Although generally referred to by the
companies that produce them as “AI” or AI-based solutions,14 some scholars
have noted that AI is defined differently in legal literature, technical

12. It is important to note here that many scholars view retaliation as a form of
discrimination itself. See Deborah Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 21 (2005)
(contending that “[r]ecognizing retaliation as a form of discrimination, one that is implicitly
banned by general proscriptions of discrimination, pushes the boundaries of dominant
understandings of discrimination in useful and productive ways.”); see also Brief of
Employment Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5, Univ. of Tex.
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 12-484) (contending “[a] long line of
cases confirms that when Congress uses the word “discriminate” that term encompasses
retaliation.”). See also Pauline Kim, Panel V: Proving Discrimination: Addressing Systemic
Discrimination: Public Enforcement and the Role of the EEOC, 95 B.U.L. REV. 1133, 1137–
38 (describing the original and evolving role of the EEOC including investigation and
enforcement of Title VII).
13. See Richard A. Bales and Katherine V.W. Stone, The Invisible Web at Work:
Artificial Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance, Under the Labor Laws, 41 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9–21 (2020) (describing the increased use of AI in the workplace).
14. See, e.g., AWARE, supra note 3 (identifying the role of AI in workplace harassment);
REVEAL, https://www.revealdata.com/ [https://perma.cc/39VZ-CNAU] (last visited May 20,
2021) (exploring the use of AI in technology).
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literature, and in the popular press and industry publications.15 This Article
generally uses the term “AI” because that is how the companies that market
so called #MeTooBots refer to them—in fact, regardless of the accuracy of
the designation, the notion that AI can replace formerly human tasks appears
to be their key selling point.16 The terms “machine learning” and “cognitive
computing” may also be used as they are common labels for the type of
technology that encompasses #MeTooBots.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I considers the environment in
which this technology arose—the increasingly digital workplace in which
many workers find themselves and the pressures of the #MeToo movement.
Part II examines the technology itself, the context for its development, and
how it functions. Part III considers the significant issues that arise when such
technologies are adopted including: (1) the overall effectiveness (or
ineffectiveness) of the technology to do what it sets out to do and the
resulting impact on underrepresented employees, (2) the potential impact on
employer liability for harassment, (3) the potential impact on victims of
harassment and decreased protection against retaliation, and (4) the effect on
victim voice, organizational culture, and more broadly, employment
discrimination law and doctrine.
Part IV concludes with some
recommendations to two audiences— employers considering adopting this
technology and courts applying antidiscrimination law in an AI world—and
proposes modifications to both the law and the technology. Rather than
rejecting what may be an inevitable move towards incorporating artificial
intelligence solutions in the workplace, this Article suggests more productive
uses of AI at work and adjustments to employment discrimination doctrine
to be better prepared for an AI-dependent world.
I. THE MODERN WORKPLACE
#MeTooBots and their harnessing of AI to monitor employee
communications have developed in the context of two major forces: (1) a
world in which, for a large majority of white collar workers, digital
communications have wholly replaced in-person interactions with a
likelihood that even after the COVID-19 pandemic, many workplaces will

15. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1684 (2020) (discussing how AI has been defined in different ways).
Ajunwa has chosen to use the terms “algorithms” and “machine learning algorithms” instead
of AI, seeing these as more precise technical terms. Id.
16. See AWARE, supra note 3 (demonstrating that companies that market technological
solutions describe them as AI).
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never return to an entirely in-person culture17, and (2) an overwhelming urge
in the corporate world to adopt tech solutions to workplace problems.18 To
understand the turn to algorithmic investigation of harassment, it is important
to consider the impact of both of these realities.
A. The Remote/Digital Workplace
The global pandemic that hit the world in early 2020 brought
innumerable changes to the workplace and the way businesses function.
Most prominently, of course, was the transition to remote work for millions
of workers as lockdown orders required anyone whose physical presence at
work was not essential to switch to working exclusively from home.19 A
Pew Research Center study of the American workforce conducted in October
2020 found a staggering shift in the way Americans work. Pre-pandemic,
approximately 20% of American workers worked from home. Due to
COVID-19, 71% of workers now work remotely and 54% want to continue
working from home even after the pandemic is over.20 In addition to this
group, approximately one third of American workers want to continue
working from home part-time when the pandemic ends, and only 11%would
not want to work remotely at all.21 Perhaps most dramatically, “some 46%
of those who rarely or never teleworked before the coronavirus outbreak say
they’d want to work from home all or most of the time when the pandemic
is over.”22
Employers are equally on-board with the switch to remote work. “A
Gartner, Inc. survey of 317 CFOs and Finance leaders on March 30, 2020
revealed that 74% will move at least 5% of their previously on-site workforce
17. See Caroline Castrillon, This is the Future of Remote Work in 2021, FORBES (Dec.
27, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinecastrillon/2021/12/27/this-is-the-future-ofremote-work-in-2021/?sh=764635f91e1d [https://perma.cc/G7U7-BWL4] (citing a recent
CFO survey that “revealed that over two-thirds (74%) plan to permanently shift employees to
remote work after the Covid-19 crisis ends”).
18. See infra Part I. 7 (discussing how companies use technology to solve workplace
issues).
19. See Clive Thompson, What If Working From Home Goes On . . . Forever?, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE (June 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/09/magazin
e/remote-work-covid.html [https://perma.cc/7S7Q-7DPL] (describing the switch to remote
work during the 2020 pandemic).
20. Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, and Rachel Minkin, How the Coronavirus
Outbreak Has – and Hasn’t – Changed the Way Americans Work, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 9,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/12/09/how-the-coronavirus-outbrea
k-has-and-hasnt-changed-the-way-americans-work/ [https://perma.cc/9SHN-2SN2].
21. Id.
22. Id.
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to permanently remote positions post-COVID 19.”23 Some commentators
think that these figures are an underestimation. “Companies as disparate as
Nationwide Insurance, the 95-year-old financial services giant, and Twitter,
a bellwether of the internet economy, have said they will make remote
working a much bigger piece of their businesses going forward.”24 This
remote work revolution, brought on by the pandemic, is likely to last because
it is both a cost-saving measure for employers and seen as a benefit by
employees.25
This switch to remote work, however, has massive implications for the
way workers communicate and for employers’ ability to monitor that
communication. Before Spring 2020, a large share of work was
accomplished via email, messaging, and the like.26 But the change to remote
work has increased that trend dramatically. The notion, oft-seen on Twitter
memes, that “this meeting really could have been done by email” was given
new life by the lockdowns across the U.S. that necessitated a switch from inperson meetings to a combination of email, messaging, and online
conferencing.27 According to Pew, these “tools have become a vital part of
the workday.”28 Eighty-one percent of remote workers “say they use video
calling or online conferencing services like Zoom or WebEx to keep in touch
with co-workers, with 59% saying they often use these types of services.”29
In addition, “some 57% say they use instant messaging platforms such as
Slack or Google Chat at least sometimes (43% use these often).”30
With this shift, formal meetings, casual conversations, and even water23. GARTNER, Gartner CFO Survey Reveals 74% Intend to Shift Some Employees to
Remote Work Permanently (April 3, 2020), https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/pressreleases/2020-04-03-gartner-cfo-surey-reveals-74-percent-of-organizations-to-shift-someemployees-to-remote-work-permanently2 [https://perma.cc/BS2C-E6SU].
24. Emily He, The New Future Of Work In A Post-Pandemic World, FORBES (June 1,
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilyhe/2020/06/01/the-new-future-of-work-in-a-postpandemic-world/?sh=34922ba03382 [https://perma.cc/6TYF-Y6D5].
25. See Maria Cramer and Mihir Zaveri, What if You Don’t Want to Go Back to the
Office?, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/business/pand
emic-work-from-home-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/DZR4-SPX3] (describing the
benefits of remote work for employers and employees).
26. See Amy Gallo, Stop Email Overload, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 21, 2012), https://hbr.
org/2012/02/stop-email-overload-1 [https://perma.cc/T6Z5-KW9X] (describing email as both
a “threat to efficiency” and “an essential work tool”).
27. See Amber Tiffany, 7 Warning Signs Your Meeting Should Be an Email,
GOTOMEETING BLOG (Nov. 2, 2017), https://blog.gotomeeting.com/7-warning-signs-yourmeeting-should-be-an-email/ [https://perma.cc/5YMU-ZMSV] (describing how an email
could achieve the same as a meeting).
28. Parker, et. al., supra note 20.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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cooler chats have morphed into digital communications that leave a record.
The most commonly used online conferencing tools like Zoom, Google
Meet, Skype, and Microsoft Teams all allow users to record meetings and
store them in the cloud or on individual computers.31 Others provide an
automatic transcript of meetings.32 Similarly, email and internal company
messaging systems all leave a digital record of communications.33 This
digital record is searchable, particularly when AI systems that offer the
ability to scan through millions of bits of data are unleashed on them.
Of course, the move to increased digital communication still creates
opportunities for inappropriate behavior and unlawful harassment. As Edgar
Ndjatou, executive director of Workplace Fairness, notes, “you don’t have
to be in the same place for sexual harassment to happen.”34 In fact, he points
out, digital harassment can take any of the following forms:
Inappropriate comments, jokes, pictures or even GIFs sent via
email, chat massages or texts; sexual or discriminatory comments
made during video meetings; commenting on a co-worker’s
appearance during video meetings; emails or text messages
requesting sexual favors; stalking on social media; [and]
unsolicited and/or inappropriate communications through
company messaging apps.35
The existence of digital harassment is nothing new. As far back as
1995, courts were assessing employer liability in sex discrimination cases
involving email communications. In Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., the court
considered a manager’s and others’ sexualized emails to be probative despite
the fact that the statements did not relate to the adverse employment
decisions at issue.36 More tellingly, in a 2000 case out of New Jersey, the
31. See Owen Hughes, Zoom vs Microsoft Teams, Google Meet, Cisco Webex and Skype:
Choosing the right video-conferencing apps for you, TECHREPUBLIC (May 13, 2020), https://
www.techrepublic.com/article/zoom-vs-microsoft-teams-google-meet-cisco-webex-andskype-choosing-the-right-video-conferencing-apps-for-you/ [https://perma.cc/9UER-PG8C]
(describing how users could use certain online conferencing tools).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., SLACK, https://slack.com/knowledge-sharing [https://perma.cc/F99BLMG6] (last visited May 20, 2021) (“With a tool like Slack, your company’s conversation
history is at your fingertips. Instead of asking someone for information every time you need
it, you can reduce repetitive questions by searching instead, saving everyone valuable time.”).
34. Sarah Gallo, Sexual Harassment in the Remote Workplace: How Training Can
Respond, TRAINING INDUS. (July 21, 2020), https://trainingindustry.com/articles/complianc
e/sexual-harassment-in-the-remote-workplace-how-training-can-respond/ [https://perma.cc/
X4LL-E6U7].
35. Id.
36. Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 91 Civ. 5928, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7433, at *13
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court considered sexual harassment claims emerging from digital
communications on an employer-related online message board. In the case
brought by a female pilot, the Court concluded that:
Although the electronic bulletin board may not have a physical
location within [the workplace], . . . it . . . should be regarded as
part of the workplace . . . [and] that if the employer had notice that
co-employees were engaged on such a work-related forum in a
pattern of retaliatory harassment directed at a co-employee, the
employer would have a duty to remedy that harassment.37
More recently, in a 2021 case alleging sexual orientation
discrimination, the court permitted a “hostile work environment” claim to
proceed based, in part, on an email communication in which management
level employees photo shopped the plaintiff’s face onto the body of a woman
wearing a Mexican style dress and emailed the photo to co-workers.38 While
a number of recent cases have concluded that the legal standard for hostile
work environment has not been met by the existence of a single
discriminatory or harassing email, for purposes of legal liability, the courts
do not distinguish between digital forms of harassment or discriminatory
comments and in-person communications and conduct.39
Given the recent expansion in the number of employees working
remotely and relying on digital communications, the EEOC’s December
2020 updated guidance on the impact of COVID-19 on the workplace saw
fit to remind employers that digital harassment was both possible and
prohibited. “Employees may not harass other employees through, for
(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995). See also Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 96 Civ. 9747, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10351, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1997) (aff’d, 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 2000)
(finding that, as a matter of law, a single e-mail containing racist jokes, “while entirely
reprehensible, cannot form the basis for a claim of hostile work environment”); CromwellGibbs v. Staybridge Suite Times Square, 16 Civ. 5169, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95762, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2017) (noting that “the sending of a single offensive e-mail” does not
create a hostile work environment).
37. Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. 2000).
38. See Tenorio v. Nevada, No. 2:20-cv-00517-GMN-VCF, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20066, at *3, 19–20 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2021) (describing a hostile work environment claim
based on photo-shopping a face on a woman’s body).
39. See, e.g., South v. Cont. Cas. Co., No. 17-cv-5741, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167907,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018) (rejecting the hostile work environment claim based on a
single email); Noack v. YMCA, No. 08-CV-3247, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154053, at *35
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2010) (single e-mail does not show severity or pervasiveness of harassment
that rises to the level required to support a hostile work environment claim); Lueck v.
Progressive Ins., Inc., No. 09-CV-6174, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96492, at *10 (W.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2009) (“The case law makes clear that the sending of a single offensive e-mail does
not create a hostile work environment”).
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example, emails, calls, or platforms for video or chat communication and
collaboration.”40 One need only consider the Jeffrey Toobin incident, in
which he was seen masturbating on a Zoom call with colleagues from The
New Yorker magazine, to understand the opportunities for inappropriate
online behavior in multiple forms.41 The move to remote work and the
increase in online communication did not end workplace harassment—it
merely moved it to a different platform. And unlike its in-person analog,
digital harassment is, more often than not, recorded, transcribed, and
searchable.
B. The Tech-Infused Workplace Environment
Numerous scholars and popular media commentators have described
the massive turn to technology by employers of all kinds. From hiring to
worker assessment, companies are utilizing an ever-increasing number of
new technological developments to assist with or take over human tasks, or
to do work that humans were never capable of. A 2019 report found that
“[e]ighty-eight percent of companies globally already use AI in some way
for [Human Resources], with 100 percent of Chinese firms and 83 percent of
U.S. employers relying on some form of the technology.”42
Within HR functions, the primary use for AI is in hiring, where tech
solutions include AI systems that scan and sort applicant resumes, recruit
applicants from a database, and track and verify applicants in the system.43
40. EEOC, What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation
Act, and Other EEO Laws (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-shouldknow-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws [https://perma.cc/J2658SK6].
41. See Katherine Rosman and Jacob Bernstein, The Undoing of Jeffrey Toobin, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020)
While working on a podcast about the presidential election for WNYC and The
New Yorker with some of the magazine’s other well-known journalists, including
Jane Mayer and Masha Gessen, he was seen lowering and raising his computer
camera, exposing and touching his penis, and motioning an air kiss to someone
other than his colleagues.
42. See Dinah Wisenberg Brin, SHRM, Employers Embrace Artificial Intelligence for
HR, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/global-hr/pages/employers-embraceartificial-intelligence-for-hr.aspx#:~:text=Eighty%2Deight%20percent%20of%20companies
,some%20form%20of%20the%20technology [https://perma.cc/8TDK-VTPG] (discussing
Mercer’s Global Talent Trends 2019 report).
43. Bales and Stone, supra note 13, at 9–10 (describing the use of AI in hiring). See also
Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick, and Jintong Tang, The Law
and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 962-973 (2017) (describing the use
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Companies like HiredScore, Ideal, and Eightfold, among others, emphasize
the ability of their AI-driven tools to review far more applicants than human
screeners could, to proactively find candidates based on prior applications,
and to address hiring bias issues.44 A 2018 survey by LinkedIn found that
the appeal of AI is largely as a time-saving mechanism for reviewing
hundreds or thousands of resumes and the AI’s perceived ability to remove
human bias from the hiring system.45 Beyond the basic keyword searching
and sorting functions, companies are increasingly turning to AI systems for
their predictive capabilities. Algorithms can be built to predict worker
performance based on resume length, hobbies listed, and education, with the
AI learning from thousands of applicants which features reliably correlate
with high performing candidates. In other words, “a machine can now
identify skills and aptitudes that don’t explicitly appear on a candidate’s
résumé.”46
In addition to the use of AI in resume and application screening, new
tech solutions are being implemented in online testing, recorded video
interviews, and even video games as part of the application process. Like
the machines used to predict performance based on resume features, AI is
used in online testing to correlate answers to specific questions with job
tenure and performance.47 Similarly, companies ask applicants to play a
video game “then use the resulting data to analyze the applicants’ risk
of people analytics in hiring and managing workforces and the legal and ethical dilemmas
attendant to it); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 857, 860-869 (2017) (discussing workforce analytics and implications for antidiscrimination law).
44. See HIREDSCORE, https://hiredscore.com/ [https://perma.cc/G6Y3-N5MN] (last
visited Feb. 9, 2021) (describing the ability of AI to help with hiring); IDEAL, https://ideal.
com/product/screening/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2021) (showing the power of AI in hiring);
EIGHTFOLD, https://eightfold.ai/ [https://perma.cc/G4TZ-GHLG] (last visited Feb. 9, 2021)
(demonstrating how AI can improve the hiring process).
45. See LINKEDIN, Global Recruiting Trends 2018, https://business.linkedin.com/conte
nt/dam/me/business/en-us/talent-solutions/resources/pdfs/linkedin-global-recruiting-trends2018-en-us2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PR5-4XFJ] (explaining how AI can save time in certain
tasks). Note that numerous legal scholars question the supposed unbiased nature of AI given
its biased human programmers and the potentially biased sources on which it relies to build
its rules. See generally Ajunwa, supra note 15, at 1699 (describing the potential for bias in
AI); Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 534 (2018)
(explaining how humans can introduce bias in algorithms); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons,
Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2019)
(discussing how algorithms can be racially biased).
46. Noam Scheiber, A.I. as Talent Scout: Unorthodox Hires, and Maybe Lower Pay, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/business/economy/artificial-int
elligence-hiring.html [https://perma.cc/34QS-L5RG].
47. Bales and Stone, supra note 13, at 11 (describing the use of AI in online testing).
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appetites, mental agility, persistence, and ability to read emotional versus
contextual clues.”48 In a much-reported development, companies like
HireVue are using AI and face-scanning technology to evaluate candidates
from a pre-recorded video interview.49 Despite scientific and legal critiques
of this technology, it has “become so pervasive in some industries, including
hospitality and finance, that universities make special efforts to train students
on how to look and speak for best results. More than 100 employers now
use the system, including Hilton and Unilever, and more than a million job
seekers have been analyzed.”50
Beyond hiring, AI is increasingly used to track and assess workers on
the job. A 2020 report includes the following areas, in addition to talent
acquisition, in which AI is useful and increasingly being implemented by HR
professionals: Onboarding, Learning and Training, Cognitive-Supporting
Decision-Making, Leadership Coaching, and Automating Administrative
Tasks.51 Using technology similar to that employed in screening resumes
and predicting job performance and tenure, companies like Workday offer
tech solutions that consider dozens of factors from the number of days off an
employee takes to reporting structure of a unit to predict “which employees
are likely to quit, which ones are likely to be disgruntled, and how the
employer might retain the best employees.”52 Some companies are building
their own algorithmic tools that can search through employees’ social media
feeds and predict, based on unrelated factors like hobbies, consumer
preferences, political affiliations and the like, which employees should be
given leadership opportunities, who will work best together in teams, and
how costly a department will be from a health insurance perspective.53
48. Id. at 13.
49. See Drew Harwell, A face-scanning algorithm increasingly decides whether you
deserve the job, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019) (discussing the use of AI in hiring). See also
Bales and Stone, supra note 13, at 11-12 (explaining how AI can be used to interview job
applicants); Julie Manning Magid, Does Your AI Discriminate?, THE CONVERSATION (May
15, 2020), https://theconversation.com/does-your-ai-discriminate-132847 [https://perma.cc/C
65Y-DL8T] (explaining the potential bias in AI regarding hiring).
50. Harwell, supra note 49.
51. See Khalid Durrani, The Impact of AI in Human Resource Decision-Making
Processes, HR TECHNOLOGIST (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.hrtechnologist.com/articles/ai-inhr/the-impact-of-ai-in-human-resource-decisionmaking-processes/#:~:text=AI%2Dbased%2
0software%20can%20automate,corporate%20compliacom%2C%20and%20litigation%20str
ategies [https://perma.cc/6ER9-9GDV] (explaining ways that AI can be used by HR
professionals).
52. Bales and Stone, supra note 13, at 14.
53. Leora Eisenstadt, Data Analytics and the Erosion of the Work/Non-Work Divide, 56
AM. BUS. L. J. 445, 472-73 (2019) (discussing various uses of algorithmic tools by companies).
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In addition to predictive analytics tools that examine seemingly
innocuous factors to predict performance, companies are also beginning to
use sentiment analysis to assess employee moods, identify attitude shifts in
a workplace, and predict inefficient periods, legal or security breaches, and
other misconduct.
AI-enabled systems will take over the task of observing and
analyzing employees’ mood before and after a client call. The HR
can then decide if the individual needs a break or can continue. AI
can also detect anxiety in a person’s behavior and tone of voice. It
will help the employers decide if they should look into the matter
and resolve it before it is harmful to the employees and the
company.54
Companies like KeenCorp and Teramind use AI to monitor employee
communications, assessing their moods and impact on productivity, and
sending tech nudges or human interventions to counteract negative attitudes,
slacking, or predicted security breaches.55 Companies are also beginning to
develop facial screening technology that can detect human emotions. For
example, Affectiva is “pioneering Human Perception AI: software that can
detect not only human emotions, but complex cognitive states, such as
drowsiness and distraction. And, in the future, it will be able to understand
human activities, interactions and objects people use.”56 While the company
purports to use its technology for the automotive industry and to support
media analytics and biometric research, it is easy to see the applications for
Human Resources. Employers could monitor employee emotional and
cognitive states through their computer screens, giving nudges, mandating
breaks, or even making promotion and termination decisions on the basis of
this data.
As Richard Bales and Katherine Stone catalogue, in the area of
electronic surveillance, there are a wide variety of new tech offerings from
wristbands that track worker movements and efficiency to AI tools that

See also Elizabeth A. Brown, The Femtech Paradox: How Workplace Monitoring Threatens
Women’s Equity, 61 JURIMETRICS J. 289, 293–95 (2021) (describing exponential growth in
biometric monitoring focused on women).
54. Durrani, supra note 51.
55. Bales and Stone, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing ways that software can monitor
employees).
56. AFFECTIVA, https://blog.affectiva.com/our-evolution-from-emotion-ai-to-human-per
ception-ai [https://perma.cc/Y3LP-FYRA] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (describing a
software’s ability to understand human activity).
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analyze word patterns in digital communications.57 There are an evergrowing number of products offering to track worker productivity. Veriato
logs everything that an employee does on his computer, tracking key strokes,
time spent on websites, and application use, and can provide screenshots,
real time alerts, and productivity reports.58 “Microsoft’s MyAnalytics
amalgamates data from a worker’s emails, calendars, and phones to calculate
how the worker spends her time, how often she is in touch with key contacts,
and whether she multitasks too frequently.”59 Amazon has patented a “haptic
wristband” that tracks employee movements and can nudge the employee to
work faster or more efficiently.60
While it may be tempting to view these technological developments as
scattered offerings and not a sign of significant industry changes, several
recent surveys demonstrate the widespread enthusiasm for AI in the Human
Resources field in particular. A 2017 study by IBM made this statement:
Our study reveals that the market for cognitive solutions in HR is
set to increase notably over the next three years: Sixty-six percent
of CEOs believe cognitive computing can drive significant value
in HR, and almost 40 percent expect their HR function to adopt
cognitive solutions during that time. Business leaders understand
that cognitive computing is a critical differentiator in the ongoing
war for talent.61
In talent development specifically, the IBM study suggested that
cognitive computing would be particularly useful in assisting HR
professionals to “understand employee sentiment and more rapidly identify
emerging issues.”62 Because of technology’s ability to monitor numerous
data sources including internal digital communications, external social
media platforms, computer and internet use, and employee facial
expressions, AI can “search for potential issues or employee concerns,”

57. See Bales and Stone, supra note 13, at 15–21 (discussing how software can monitor
human activity).
58. See VERIATO, https://www.veriato.com/products/veriato-vision-employee-monitorin
g-software [https://perma.cc/L5G2-TVTB] (last visited May 18, 2021) (discussing one
mechanism of electronic surveillance).
59. Bales and Stone, supra note 13, at 16–17.
60. Id. at 17. See also Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know.
(And Amazon Has a Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/6V5K6GDJ] (describing the ability of a wristband to track employee movement).
61. IBM INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS VALUE, EXTENDING EXPERTISE - HOW COGNITIVE
COMPUTING IS TRANSFORMING HR AND THE EMPLOYEE EXPERIENCE 5 (2017), https://www.ibm
.com/downloads/cas/QVPR1K7D [https://perma.cc/GS3M-T7RV].
62. Id. at 13.
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serving as “canaries in a virtual coal mine,” identifying hot topics and longerterm trends that could affect employee morale and performance.”63
A recent Oracle study suggests that employers and employees are
equally enthusiastic. Titled “From Fear to Enthusiasm,” Oracle’s 2019 study
surveyed over “8,000 HR leaders, managers, and other employees across 10
countries on their attitudes toward and behaviors regarding AI.”64 Like the
IBM study, Oracle’s survey demonstrated that HR leaders are most
optimistic about using AI.65 The study also showed that “as many as 50%
of . . . survey respondents this year said they’re currently using some form
of AI at work. That’s an impressive jump from the 32% who said this in last
year’s survey.”66 Perhaps more surprising is the finding that employees are
embracing the technology as well.
Workers apparently now trust robots more than they trust their
managers. Consider this: As many as 82% of our survey
respondents said they think robots can do certain types of work
better than their managers. A whopping 64% said they’d trust a
robot more than their manager, and 50% have turned to a robot
instead of their manager for advice, with nearly 25% saying they
“always” or “very often” ask AI questions rather than over asking
their boss.67
In response to a question about how their companies are already using
AI, the survey showed the following: 31% are using it to collect data on
employees and customers, 28% are using it to develop software for training,
24% use AI to manage customer-support replies, 22% use it to operate digital
assistants, 21% use it to predict hiring success rate and employee retention,
and 17% use it to process job applications.68 It is abundantly clear that the
adoption of AI in HR functions is not a passing trend but rather an
increasingly permanent fixture.
It is in the context of these dual realities— the exponential increase in
digital communications and the overwhelming embrace of AI in hiring and
managing employees—that companies have now proposed the use of AI to
detect and report sexual harassment of all kinds. Like the existing critiques

63. Id.
64. See ORACLE & FUTURE WORKPLACE, FROM FEAR TO ENTHUSIASM – ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IS WINNING MORE HEARTS AND MINDS IN THE WORKPLACE 2 (2019), https://w
ww.oracle.com/a/ocom/docs/applications/hcm/ai-at-work-ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8X6
-E9CZ] (examining the role of AI in HR).
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id. at 13.
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of AI-based technology in the workplace, this move into AI-driven
harassment detection brings ethical and legal problems that must be
explored. Unlike prior critiques that have often focused on the biases that
may be inherent in AI innovations, the development of #MeTooBots
necessitates an examination of the role of human reporters in both employer
defenses and employee protections and the implications of replacing that
human reporter with an automated bot.
II. #METOOBOTS’ CAPABILITIES: THE WHY AND THE HOW
The technology behind #MeTooBots has been hailed by some as part
of a promising future and by others as a woefully inadequate replacement for
human interventions. This section will explore why this innovation has
gained traction, what companies attempt to do with this technology, and the
ways in which it can and cannot mimic or improve upon human abilities.
A. Why create #MeTooBots?
The development of #MeTooBots seems to have been a response to the
acknowledgment of digital harassment as a workplace reality and an attempt
to solve two major issues for businesses—(1) the persistence of workplace
harassment and increased attention and pressure on employers to rectify
“toxic workplaces” and (2) despite its persistence, dramatic underreporting
of workplace harassment. Notwithstanding the fact that digital and online
harassment, as described above, has been acknowledged by Human
Resources professionals, the EEOC, and the popular media, some companies
may operate on the mistaken notion that the move to remote work will reduce
harassment in the workplace overall.69 Born of a faulty understanding of
harassment as being solely physical or somehow requiring face-to-face
interactions, the reality is that harassment encompasses a wide range of
communications, behaviors, and interactions that includes digital, verbal,
and physical interactions.70 In fact, recent reports suggest that people go
beyond harassing their human co-workers in online platforms and will even
harass digital assistants and bots. Apple’s Siri and Microsoft’s Cortana have
69. See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text (analyzing remote work and
harassment claims).
70. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC), HARASSMENT,
https://www.eeoc.gov/harassment [https://perma.cc/3RDX-HLGL] (“Offensive conduct may
include, but is not limited to, offensive jokes, slurs, epithets or name calling, physical assaults
or threats, intimidation, ridicule or mockery, insults or put-downs, offensive objects or
pictures, and interference with work performance.”).
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both been on the receiving end of verbal abuse. CNN reports, “[a] side effect
of creating friendly female personalities is that people also want to talk dirty,
confess their love, role play, or bombard them with insults.”71 Given this
tendency, the fact that workers would behave inappropriately with coworkers online as they do in person is a fairly obvious notion, particularly
since many workers do not think about the fact that their online behavior is
being recorded, transcribed, or observed.72
In addition to the reality of online or digital harassment, the #MeToo
Movement’s increase in attention to harassment has created a concomitant
pressure on companies to rectify the problem by “catching” and eliminating
harassers. The phrase “Me too,” coined by activist Tarana Burke in 2006
took on new life in 2017 when numerous actresses accused producer Harvey
Weinstein of sexual harassment, followed by accusations against and
resignations or other career consequences for Amazon Studios head Roy
Price, Fox News host Bill O’Reilly and chairman and CEO Roger Ailes,
actor Kevin Spacey, comedian Louis C.K., public radio personality Garrison
Keillor, U.S. Senator Al Franken, celebrity chef Mario Batali, and many
other figures in business, media, sports, education, government,
entertainment, and politics.73 The movement led to the unearthing of
rampant sexual harassment across industries and put significant pressure on
workplaces of all kinds to improve in this area.74 This pressure is both
external and internal. Companies are responding to the brand reputation
issues associated with the uncovering of harassment in a workplace and the

71. Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, Taming The Golem: Challenges Of Ethical
Algorithmic Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 153 (2017) (quoting Heather Kelly,
Even Virtual Assistants Are Sexually Harassed, CNN (Feb. 5, 2016, 10:41 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/05/technology/virtual-assistants-sexual-harassment/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/7374-FAC4].
72. See Eisenstadt, Data Analytics, supra note 53, at 469 (describing the reality that
despite the fact that workers know their computers and phones are owned by employers and
subject to monitoring, “this technical knowledge rarely stops employees from using those
devices for personal e-mail, personal social media networking, and generally communicating
thoughts, pictures, and other information that they would not actively want to share with their
employers”).
73. See Chicago Tribune, #MeToo: A timeline of events, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 4,
2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/DX5H-PJHL] (discussing various sexual abuse accusations against
numerous high-profile individuals).
74. See Riley Griffin, Hannah Recht and Jeff Green, #MeToo: One Year Later,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-me-too-anniversary/
[https://perma.cc/PAU4-HK8J] (discussing how after numerous sexual abuse allegations
were reported across industries, there was an emphasis on preventing further abuse).
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increased costs of investigations and litigation.75 They are also beginning to
recognize the impact of harassment on employee health and well-being,
affecting absences from work and insurance costs.76 Harassment can also
impact productivity since “[h]arassed people [are] less satisfied with their
jobs, and [are] more likely to want to leave.”77
The results of this attention have been demands for increased
transparency, diversity, and most profoundly, a focus on company culture.
More board members will ask tough questions about efforts to
increase diversity and programs to foster a respectful culture. . . .
We’ll see similar shifts in funding, with more venture capitalists
prioritizing company culture and diversity in investment
decisions. Soon it will no longer be uncommon for a VC to ask
about diversity at the top or plans to create a more inclusive
workplace. While not every investor will focus on culture and
diversity, the smart ones will (and some already are).78
And for some businesses, the #MeToo Movement increased the value
of data analytics in efforts to detect and fix problems before they take over.
As one commentator put it, “Rather than solving a culture problem after the
fact, you can identify issues early on and course correct. . . . Whether it’s
adopting HR tech for your organization, asking difficult questions, or
focusing on inclusion initiatives, each of us has a role in creating a strong
company culture.”79
At the same time, creators of AI harassment monitors are responding to
the unfortunate reality that employees across industries often fail to report

75. See, e.g. Mike Isaac, Uber Investigating Sexual Harassment Claims by Ex-Employee,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/business/uber-sexual-har
assment-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/YP3W-83UM] (explaining Uber’s investigation
regarding claims of a fired engineer); Steven Overly, Uber hires Eric Holder to investigate
sexual harassment claims, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2017) (detailing Holder’s involvement in
Uber’s investigation of sexual harassment claims); Olivia Solon, Uber fires more than 20
employees after sexual harassment investigation, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/06/uber-fires-employees-sexual-harassm
ent-investigation [https://perma.cc/2RLJ-ZY9S] (describing Uber’s investigations into claims
of sexual harassment within the company).
76. Julia Shaw and Camilla Elphick, In the #MeToo Era, a chatbot can help people report
workplace harassment, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 19, 2018), https://theconversation.com/inthe-metoo-era-a-chatbot-can-help-people-report-workplace-harassment-92565 [https://perma
.cc/L2RR-SXN2].
77. Id.
78. Spencer Rascoff, 3 Ways #MeToo Will Influence the Business World in 2018, INC.
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.inc.com/spencer-rascoff/3-ways-metoo-will-influence-businessworld-in-2018.html. [https://perma.cc/8E94-PS92].
79. Id.
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harassment. According to a meta-analysis of studies, “only a quarter to a
third of people who have been harassed at work report it to a supervisor or
union representative, and 2 percent to 13 percent file a formal complaint.”80
Researchers have identified numerous barriers to reporting including unclear
or confusing processes, reluctance to discuss personal issues or sexual
behavior, and most commonly, lack of trust and fear of retaliation, “citing
negative consequences when others reported incidents.”81 A New York
Times investigation at Fox News showed that “women who worked at Fox
said they didn’t complain to human resources because they feared they
would be fired.”82 A recent survey at the FDIC suggested significant
underreporting of harassment and concluded that fear of retaliation was one
of the primary reasons for the underreporting.83 Similar findings emerged
from an investigation at the State Department, which “revealed 47 percent
of department employees surveyed who experienced or observed harassment
failed to tell the State Department’s internal bureaus that handle misconduct
complaints.”84 And again, the reasons for the underreporting include “lack
of confidence in the department’s ability to resolve complaints, fear of
retaliation and reluctance to discuss the harassment with others.”85
This fear of retaliation is decidedly justified. In 2020, “Workers
alleging employers unlawfully retaliated against them once again topped the
charts of claims filed with the EEOC . . . , a trend that’s held strong for at
least three years, and now through a pandemic.”86 At least one court has
recognized this fear of retaliation and considered it a reasonable justification
for an employee to fail to report her harassment with potential impacts on
80. Claire Cain Miller, It’s Not Just Fox: Why Women Don’t Report Sexual Harassment,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/upshot/its-not-just-foxwhy-women-dont-report-sexual-harassment.html[https://perma.cc/SC98-54J2] (referencing
Lilia M. Cortina and Jennifer L. Berdahl, Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Decade of
Research in Review in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (2008),
https://lsa.umich.edu/psych/lilia-cortina-lab/Cortina&Berdahl.2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJC8-TAX6]).
81. Shaw and Elphick, supra note 76.
82. Miller, supra note 80.
83. See Federal Manager’s Daily Report, Harassment, Fear of Retaliation Reported at
FDIC, FEDWEEK (July 17, 2020), https://www.fedweek.com/federal-managers-daily-report/h
arassment-fear-of-retaliation-reported-at-fdic/ [https://perma.cc/GZ5R-TDLU] (explaining
that out of the 91 FDIC respondents surveyed who experienced sexual harassment, only 12
had reported sexual harassment allegations).
84. Pranshu Verma, Sexual Harassment Underreported at State Department, Report
Says, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/us/politics/sexualharassment-underreported-state-department.html [https://perma.cc/8967-BMBV].
85. Id.
86. Paige Smith, EEOC Again Sees Prevalence of Workplace Retaliation Claims,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 26, 2021).
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employer liability. In Minarsky v. Susquehanna County,87 the Third Circuit
acknowledged the #MeToo stories that have shared this fear and noted that
“a jury could conclude that [an] employee’s nonreporting was
understandable, perhaps even reasonable.”88
Given the realities of digital harassment, massive underreporting by
victims of harassment, and increasing pressure to take action in this area, it
is perhaps unsurprising that companies are looking for “easy” solutions. It
is in this context that AI-based harassment monitors have been developed
and marketed—the #MeTooBots can scour every digital communication and
report anything problematic to HR or in-house counsel, thereby eliminating
the need for a human reporter and alleviating the problem of underreporting
while taking action to “fix” toxic workplaces or remove problem workers.
But this approach is laden with problems both technical and ethical/legal.
B. What do #MeTooBots Do?
To understand what #MeTooBots do and how they do it, it is essential
to understand the process of algorithmic decision-making and machine
learning. In general, AI is considered to be an approach that uses
“technology to automate tasks that ‘normally require human
intelligence.’ . . . [T]he technology is often focused upon automating specific
types of tasks: those that are thought to involve intelligence when people
perform them.”89
Among the companies that offer AI-based harassment monitors are
NexLP and Aware.90 As Aware explains, the use of developing technology
to monitor and secure data has been commonplace for decades. What is new
is the use of AI to enhance the capabilities of this technology. “An AI
algorithm uses Machine Learning (ML) to adapt over time, making it more
‘smart’ and ‘secure’ over time.”91 Applying this technology to the human
resources function, Aware suggests a dramatic shift in the accuracy and
87. 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018).
88. Id. at 314 (The court found that “[i]f a plaintiff’s genuinely held, subjective belief of
potential retaliation from reporting her harassment appears to be well-founded and a jury
could find that this belief is objectively reasonable. . .the court should leave the issue for the
jury to determine at trial”).
89. Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U.L. REV.
1305, 1307 (2019).
90. See infra note 91, 94. See also Sejuti Das, AI To Combat Sexual Harassment With
Chatbots, Apps & Trained Algorithms, ANALYTICS INDIA MAGAZINE (June 1, 2020),
https://analyticsindiamag.com/ai-to-combat-sexual-harassment-with-chatbots-apps-trainedalgorithms/ [https://perma.cc/QXY4-THNV].
91. AWARE, supra note 3.
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breadth of its detection capabilities.
Without artificial intelligence algorithms, monitoring platforms on
the market leverage only keyword matching to identify suspicious
instances of digital communications. . . . By leveraging AI-infused
technology, such as Aware, organizations can identify, investigate,
and handle offensive communications in the early stage – without
requiring the victim to report the incident to a superior.92
Reveal, which recently acquired NexLP, 93 offers products that use
natural language processing and sentiment analysis to monitor
communications in order to detect problematic behavior in an organization.94
The company suggests application of its technology in the compliance and
HR spaces and specifically proposes its use to “identify conversations and
communications . . . [c]ontaining descriptive language related to sexual acts
or inappropriate behavior, including ones that are general in nature as well
as ones that target a specific person or situation.”95 Like Aware, Reveal’s
AI-based products aim to make early detection and prevention easier and
more cost-effective. As Reveal’s promotional materials explain:
Reveal can empower your compliance team to quickly and
efficiently analyze communication content for potential policy
violations and legal risk. Our data visualizations, transparent
concept search and machine learning technology can expedite the
identification of compliance issues while suppressing the
communication noise . . . With Reveal, your compliance team can
stay ahead of the legal risk curve by helping your organization
avoid downstream legal action including litigation and regulatory
fines.96
While the companies that advertise these bots do not, for obvious
92. Id.
93. Jennifer Fournier, Reveal Acquires NexLP to become the leading AI-powered
eDiscovery Solution, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.com/i
n/news-releases/reveal-acquires-nexlp-to-become-the-leading-ai-powered-ediscovery-soluti
on-844046460.html [https://perma.cc/DWU9-EYNU].
94. Offering AI with “emotional intelligence”, Reveal’s NexLP suggests its technology
“[a]utomatically recognizes discussions around positive or negative events within your
content. Communications are assigned a sentiment score which can be used to prioritize
‘hotspots’ of evidence. This feature is also used to detect fraudulent type behavior within
organizations to help reduce compliance risk.” REVEAL, Artificial Intelligence, https://www
.revealdata.com/nexlp-ai# [https://perma.cc/CPU9-WSZR].
95. George Socha, AI in the Legal Sector – the Obvious Choice, REVEAL Oct. 27, 2021,
https://resource.revealdata.com/en/blog/ai-in-legal-sector-obvious-choice?hsLang=en [https:
//perma.cc/XB6L-R5VU].
96. Reveal Brainspace, https://www.revealdata.com/compliance [https://perma.cc/DE4
U-TTUH].
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reasons, describe exactly how the technology works, we can make some
basic assumptions based on other AI-based monitoring technology. In
general, the AI-based technologies are not actually “thinking” but rather
producing “intelligent results without intelligence” by “detecting patterns in
data and using knowledge, rules, and information that have been specifically
encoded by people into forms that can be processed by computers.”97
The form of AI technology that is most likely employed by the
harassment monitors and the broad category of techniques that is most often
referred to in monitoring technology is machine learning. “Most machinelearning methods work by detecting useful patterns in large amounts of data.
These systems can then apply these patterns in various tasks, such as driving
a car or detecting fraud, in ways that often produce useful, intelligentseeming results.”98 One example that is particularly useful in understanding
harassment monitors is to consider commonly-used e-mail spam filters.
Harry Surden explains:
Most e-mail software uses machine learning to automatically
detect incoming spam e-mails (i.e. unwanted, unsolicited
commercial e-mails) and divert them into a separate spam folder.
How does such a machine-learning system automatically identify
spam? Often the key is to “train” the system by giving it multiple
examples of spam e-mails and multiple examples of “wanted” emails. The machine-learning software can then detect patterns
across these example e-mails that it can later use to determine the
likelihood that a new incoming e-mail is either spam or wanted.
For instance, when a new e-mail arrives, users are usually given
the option to mark the e-mail as spam or not. Every time users
mark an e-mail as spam, they are providing a training example for
the system. This signals to the machine-learning software that this
is a human-verified example of a spam e-mail that it should
analyze for telltale patterns that might distinguish it from wanted
e-mails. . . . One common approach simply uses word
probabilities. In that technique, the system attempts to detect
words and phrases that are more likely than average to appear in a
spam e-mail. . . .We can think of this as an intelligent result
because this is roughly what a person would have done had he
quickly scanned the e-mail, noticed [the words commonly found
in spam emails] and decided it was spam.99
In essence, machine learning programs are provided with an initial set
97. Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1305, 1308 (2019).
98. Id. at 1311.
99. Id. at 1312–13.
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of rules and then permitted to program themselves as more and more data is
presented. They are constantly improving over time as they further hone the
patterns from larger and larger bodies of data. 100
As Surden points out, it is important to understand that many AI
systems, including #MeTooBots as advertised, include some human
decision-making.101 “This system design is known as having ‘a human in the
loop.’”102 The AI system will function autonomously up to a point where it
is trained to involve a human in the process.103 In the context of the AI-based
harassment monitors, the AI appears to function autonomously until it
identifies inappropriate digital communication, at which point, it does not
dole out punishment on its own but rather reports the occurrence to Human
Resources or in-house counsel for review.104
Lastly, the AI-based harassment monitors likely depend also on
“natural language processing” (NLP) in order to make sense of the words,
phrases and patterns that they detect. “NLP is the study of computational
linguistics, which includes natural language understanding (NLU) and
natural language generation (NLG).”105 Whereas machine learning describes
the process of pattern recognition and prediction based on those patterns,
NLP refers to the computer’s ability to “process, understand, and generate
language representations as well as humans.”106 Because human language
makes meaning based on more than words alone, NLP involves teaching
computers to understand context, syntax, and semantics.107 The goal of NLP
tools is to allow the computer to parse text and predict its meaning – whether
it expresses positive or negative sentiment, whether it is inappropriate or

100. Id. at 1314. In addition to machine learning, some AI tools use what Surden refers
to as “logical rules and knowledge representation” or a hybrid approach that combines both
types of AI. Id. at 1316-19. “Knowledge representation” systems typically involve
programmers providing the computer with a series of rules “that represent the underlying logic
and knowledge of whatever activity the programmers are trying to model and automate.” Id.
at 1316. In hybrid form, the AI uses a combination of machine learning to track and process
patterns in data with a series of rules and knowledge translated into computer-processable
form. Id. at 1320.
101. Id. at 1320.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Woodford, supra note 1 (explaining how bots can identify potential bullying and
harassment, but then send those interactions to humans who are lawyers or human resource
professionals to investigate).
105. Brian S. Haney, Applied Natural Language Processing For Law Practice, 2020 B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 4 (2020).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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harmless, and so on.108 Regardless of the specific tool the AI relies upon or,
more likely, the combination of tools, this technology allows companies to
monitor, flag, and automatically report inappropriate communications
without involving the sender or receiver in that process.109
III. PROBLEMS WITH #METOOBOTS: FUNCTIONAL, LEGAL, AND
ETHICAL
As described above, #MeTooBots that use AI-based technologies to
monitor, detect, and report digital harassment emerged from a need to take
action on the massive problem of unreported sexual harassment in the
workplace. While there are clearly benefits to increased attention to
harassing communications and to the need to detect issues despite
underreporting, this technology has numerous technical inadequacies and
more importantly for this article, creates several legal and ethical problems.
This Section details both the functional and legal/ethical obstacles and
discusses existing scholarship that brings to light similar concerns with
related uses of AI in the workplace.

108. NATASHA DUARTE, EMMA LLANSO, AND ANNA LOUP, MIXED MESSAGES? THE LIMITS
AUTOMATED SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 9, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S6F2-3UKZ].
109. It is important to also understand that although referred to as “#MeTooBots” these
AI-based harassment monitors are distinct from chat bots that may also use some form of AIbased technology. These chat bots allow a victim to report an incident to a robot instead of
another person, creating an increased comfort level and sense of confidentiality. “The Spot
chatbot – designed to improve the reporting process for those who have experienced or
witnessed workplace harassment or discrimination – guides the participant through an
evidence-based cognitive interview without requiring them to talk to a human.” Julia Shaw
and Camilla Elphick, In the #MeToo Era, a chatbot can help people report workplace
harassment, THE CONVERSATION (March 19, 2018), https://theconversation.com/in-themetoo-era-a-chatbot-can-help-people-report-workplace-harassment-92565 [https://perma.cc/
E7CU-4V2S]. Scientists in Nigeria developed a chatbot named Biri that allows victims of
physical and sexual abuse to record their stories before offering a connection to a human
counselor. Bots Supporting the #MeToo Movement, INSTABOT BLOG (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://blog.instabot.io/instabot-blog/2018/9/bots-supporting-the-metoo-movement [https://
perma.cc/8QNR-6K9Q]. Likewise, an Indian company created Me2Bot, which provides a
confidential platform for victims of workplace harassment to report their experiences. The
bot then sends users resources to help them deal with the particular incident. Id. These tools
offer an AI-based platform with which victims can communicate, rather than an algorithm
that searches through digital communications to detect harassment. For chat bots to function,
victims need to come forward and report incidents of harassment or assault. For the
#MeTooBots that function as harassment monitors to function, no such action is required; the
victim can remain passive throughout the process.
OF
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A. Functional Problems with AI-based Harassment Monitors
The primary focus of this article is the legal/ethical problems inherent
in using AI-based harassment monitors. Nonetheless, it is important to
understand the ways in which the technology itself is still limited in its ability
to perform its designated function both as a general matter and because those
limitations, in fact, impact both the legal rights of employees on whom it is
used and the legal liability of employers who use it. This is particularly true
for already marginalized employees who may find their communications
targeted by the AI because of the functional problems inherent in these tools.
1.

Nuanced Human Communication

The most essential deficiency in #MeTooBots’ functionality emerges
from a basic problem that arises when AI is tasked with “understanding”
language—computers are relatively bad at comprehending the nuances of
human communication. The meaning of verbal communications is derived
from contextual clues including the social and cultural identity of the
speakers, the nature of the communication, the relationship between the
parties, the history of such communications, and potentially hundreds of
other factors.110 However, “AI can only reliably conduct basic story analysis,
meaning it is taught to look for specific triggers. It cannot go beyond that
parameter and cannot pick up on broader cultural or unique interpersonal
dynamics.”111 This problem arises frequently in the context of algorithms
used to screen job applicants’ social media profiles. Such tools “have limited
ability to parse the nuanced meaning of human communication, or to detect
the intent or motivation of the speaker. Even the most advanced technology
companies struggle to define and automatically identify ‘toxic’ content.”112

110. See generally Leora F. Eisenstadt, The N-Word at Work: Contextualizing
Language in the Workplace, 33 B ERKELEY J. E MP. & LAB . L. 299 (2012) (discussing
contextual nature of language and its meaning).
111. Woodford, supra note 1.
112. MIRANDA BOGEN & AARON RIEKE, UPTURN, HELP WANTED: AN EXAMINATION OF
HIRING ALGORITHMS, EQUITY, AND BIAS 40 (Dec. 2018), https://www.upturn.org/reports
/2018/hiring-algorithms [https://perma.cc/277F-ZG97]. In fact, among studies that assess the
accuracy of natural language processing tools in determining the meaning of text, “the highest
accuracy rates reported hover around 80%, with most of the high-performing tools achieving
70 to 75% accuracy.” DUARTE , et. Al., supra note 108, at 5. While this is remarkable from a
technological standpoint, it means that a significant number of determinations made by the
AI is “wrong,” and depending on the particular use of the AI, this inaccuracy rate can have
unacceptable consequences for those individuals whose communications are improperly
judged. Id.
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This problem is compounded in the arena of sexual harassment because,
as Brian Subirana points out in The Guardian, communication of a sexual
nature is particularly complex. “There’s a type of harassment that is very
subtle and very hard to pick up. We have these training courses [about
harassment] . . . and it requires the type of understanding that AI is not yet
capable of.”113 The problem is also amplified in the harassment context
because the line between acceptable and inappropriate communication is not
always entirely clear to the people involved. That line may be dependent on
context and on the relationship between and prior history of the parties
involved.114
This is particularly true when legal parameters are grafted onto this
already fraught area. Two judges considering nearly identical verbal
communications may classify them differently with respect to the law.
Where one judge may find a particularly egregious sexual comment to be
unlawful harassment, another may view it as a solitary event that is not
“severe or pervasive” enough to be considered unlawful under the relevant
legal doctrine.115
Adding AI to this mix yields problematic results. Natural language
processing tools, the primary technology used by AI-based monitors, require
clear rules that guide the system on which words, phrases, and combinations
to flag.
[T]oday’s AI produces results by “detecting patterns in data and
using knowledge, rules, and information that have been
specifically encoded by people into forms that can be processed
by computers.” It “excels in narrow, limited settings, like chess,
that have particular characteristics--often where there are clear

113. Woodford, supra note 1.
114. See Eisenstadt, N-Word at Work, supra note 110, at 316–20. See also DEBORAH
TANNEN, GENDER & DISCOURSE 19-20 (1994)
In analyzing discourse, many researchers operate on the unstated assumption that
all speakers proceed along similar lines of interpretation, so a particular example
of discourse can be taken to represent how discourse works for all speakers. For
some aspects of discourse, this is undoubtedly true. Yet a large body of
sociolinguistic literature makes clear that, for many aspects of discourse, this is
so only to the extent that cultural background is shared. . . . Thus, a strategy that
seems, or is, intended to dominate may in another context or in the mouth of
another speaker be intended or used to establish connection. Similarly, a strategy
that seems, or is, intended to create connection can in another context or in the
mouth of another speaker be intended or used to establish dominance.
115. See Jeffrey R. Boles, Leora Eisenstadt, and Jennifer M. Pacella, Whistleblowing in
the Compliance Era, 55 GEORGIA L. REV. 147, 165 (2020) (describing the varied ways that
courts treat similar facts when applying harassment and antidiscrimination doctrine).
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right or wrong answers, where there are discernable underlying
patterns and structures, and where fast search and computation
provides advantages over human cognition.”116
In contrast to a game of chess, the application of anti-discrimination law
to instances of sexual harassment does not come with precise rules on which
the AI can rely.117 Attorneys and courts make judgments in cases based on
experience and common sense, judging the communication by its words and
context.118 The system relies on evaluators’ ability to be flexible in their
understanding and judgments. They are “sensitive to context, both to
extenuating circumstances in individual cases and shifts in social norms over
time, and can flexibly apply legal rules.”119 As Rebecca Crootof explains,
AI-based tools are “brittle,” making them ill-equipped to comprehend and
judge nuanced, contextual, and subtle forms of human communication.120
The notion that AI can competently identify inappropriate or unlawful
communications in the sexual harassment sphere ignores this basic
functionality problem.

116. Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-In,
119 COLUM. L. REV. FORUM 233, 237 (quoting Surden, supra note 97, at 1308 (noting that
“[t]his description of AI programming roughly encompasses both machine learning and rulebased systems, as most AI systems today incorporate elements of both”).
117. Woodford, supra note 1. See also DUARTE et al., supra note 108, at 16.
118. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
We have emphasized . . . that the objective severity of harassment should be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
considering ‘all the circumstances.’ In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that
inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular
behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.
119. Crootof, supra note 116, at 238.
120. Id. at 239–40 (describing the difficulty of using AI to automate enforcement of even
simple laws and pointing to unsuccessful attempts to automate speeding laws). The NLP tools
that are marketed as “off the shelf” are particularly vulnerable to this critique of inflexibility.
Language use can vary considerably across and within social media platforms,
demographic groups, and topics of conversation. The language people use in
captions when sharing images of their pets on Instagram has very different
characteristics from the language used to discuss major geopolitical events on
Facebook. A tool trained to recognize the former cannot be reliably applied to
analyze the latter. NLP tools must be trained to recognize the particular type (or
“domain”) of speech they will be used to analyze; otherwise their performance
will suffer.
DUARTE et al., supra note 108, at 4.
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Signal and Bias Problems

In addition to these basic problems is the related issue that Natural
Language Processing tools, despite often being relied upon to counteract
human implicit bias, may often, in fact, “amplify social bias reflected in
language.”121 The AI tools learn the “rules of interpretation” from the data
provided by their human coders. If the data provided is biased in any way,
the results produced by the AI will be biased as well.122
Several studies have found, for example, that machine learning
models reflect or amplify gender bias in the text used to train them.
This type of bias could lead to content moderation decisions that
disproportionately censor or misinterpret the speech of certain
groups, such as marginalized groups or those with minority
views.123
The “signal problems” typically arise when the data provided to the
machine learning tool does not sufficiently include speech patterns of
underrepresented groups.124 Unless the AI tool is trained on speech patterns
encompassing diverse races, ethnicities, genders, and socioeconomic groups,
harassing communications will be missed, and innocuous comments will be
mischaracterized as inappropriate or unlawful harassment. For example,
ProPublica did a study in which it created a tool using word2vec, which
creates “word embeddings” based on how words are related to each other
and the context and order in which they appear, and uses the resulting “word
maps” to make meaning.125 ProPublica’s tool was trained on a variety of
“media diets” to test the output based on the training data.
For the term “imma,” frequently used in African-American
Vernacular English, only the algorithm trained on a digital media
diet recognized the word and produced results. The outputs for
“imma” were mostly offensive words that would likely be
121. DUARTE et al., supra note 108, at 4.
122. See Ajunwa, supra note 15, at 1685–86.
123. DUARTE et al., supra note 108, at 4. See also Cade Metz, Using A.I. to Find Bias in
A.I., N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2021 (describing the problem of bias in artificial intelligence which
is “facing increasing scrutiny from regulators and is a growing business for start-ups and tech
stalwarts”).
124. See Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013, 12:40
AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/10/think-again-big-data [https://perma.cc/T4F4-V5
4J] (cited in Ajunwa, supra note 15, at 1686). See also Dirk Hovy & L. Shannon Spruit, The
Social Impact of Natural Language Processing, PROC. ASSOC. FOR COMPUTATIONAL
LINGUISTICS (2016); Maider Lehr, Kyle Gorman, & Izhak Shafran, Discriminative
Pronunciation Modeling for Dialectal Speech Recognition, PROC. INTERSPEECH (2014).
125. DUARTE et al., supra note 108, at 11.
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associated with hate speech or threats, even though “imma” simply
means “I’m going to.”126
Were an AI-based harassment monitor to be trained on similar data, it
might identify this and other words from African-American Vernacular
English (AAVE) as threatening or harassing despite the prevalence of
completely innocuous uses. Similarly, when NLP tools are imposed on nonEnglish text or text in languages that are not well-represented in online
sources, the accuracy rate again suffers because of the limited data on which
they are trained.
A major limitation of NLP today is the fact that most NLP
resources and systems are available only for high-resource
languages (HRLs) such as English, French, Spanish, German, and
Chinese. In contrast, many low-resource languages (LRLs)—such
as Bengali, Indonesian, Punjabi, Cebuano, and Swahili—spoken
and written by millions of people have no such resources or
systems available.127
Many NLP tools are trained to avoid non-English text altogether.128
This is particularly problematic when the NLP tool misidentifies dialects as
being non-English. For example, popular NLP tools tend to misidentify
African-American Vernacular English (AAVE) as non-English. “One
system identified examples of AAVE as Danish with 99.9% confidence.”129
If the NLP tool is trained to skip over non-English text, significant portions
of dialect-based communications may be overlooked altogether. When AIbased tools attempt to transcribe spoken communications (as Zoom and other
video conferencing tools provide), the ability of the tools to “understand”
dialects and gender and racial speech patterns is again problematic. “A 2017
study found that YouTube auto-captioning had a higher error rate for

126. Id. at 14. Interestingly, this same word also means “mother” or “mom” in Hebrew
and is sometimes used by otherwise English-speaking Jews to refer to their mothers (like this
author’s children), demonstrating again the complexity of human written and verbal
communication.
127. Julia Hirschberg & Christopher D. Manning, Advances in Natural Language
Processing, 349 SCIENCE 261, 261 (July 17, 2015), https://cs224d.stanford.edu/papers/advan
ces.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZV2L-MRFP]. “High-resource languages” refers to the quantity of
training data available in those languages. See DUARTE et al., supra note 108, at 14.
128. DUARTE et al., supra note 108, at 15.
129. Id. (citing Su Lin Blodgett & Brendan O’Connor, Racial Disparity in Natural
Language Processing: A Case Study of Social Media African-American English, PROC.
FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY IN MACH. LEARNING CONF. (2017),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.00061.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR8C-S8J5]).
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captioning female speakers than for male speakers in videos.”130
These functional and bias-amplification problems impact the accuracy
of AI-based tools’ ability to “understand” or make meaning out of human
communication whether spoken or written. The failures mean that AI-based
monitors may improperly investigate and report benign communications, a
danger that will likely be borne more frequently by employees of color and
any groups whose communication is underrepresented in the training
process. This, in turn, exposes already marginalized employees to additional
discrimination and harassment in the form of unnecessary, disruptive, and
demeaning investigations. The workplace may understandably feel even
more hostile to employees whose communications are regularly flagged and
investigated even if they are ultimately exonerated. And whereas under
normal circumstances, a human resources officer might quickly discount
such a benign communication, when AI is involved, this instinct is often
overridden by what Ifeoma Ajunwa refers to as the “unquestioning belief in
data objectivity.”131 Thinking that if the AI suggested this was problematic,
it is at least deserving of further investigation. Those who rely on these
algorithms begin to trust them implicitly, becoming blind to the ways in
which AI is incapable of understanding nuanced language and the ways in
which it fails to accurately capture the breadth of human communication.
B. Legal and Ethical Problems Inherent in #MeTooBots
When evaluating new tools (often involving new technology) that
employers deploy in the workplace, there is a tendency in popular media and
legal scholarship to focus primarily on the impact on employee rights and
protections. That exclusive focus is a mistake in this and other areas because
a closer look at the technology exposes problematic implications for
employer and employee alike. Employers’ exposure to greater liability and
employees’ increased vulnerability to lawful retaliation, in this case, creates
an alignment of interests that, if understood, cautions against blindly
adopting #MeTooBot technology.
1.

Impact on Employer Liability

Although sexual harassment is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil
130. DUARTE et al., supra note 108, at 15 (citing Rachael Tatman, Gender and Dialect
Bias in YouTube’s Automatic Captions, PROC. OF THE FIRST ASSOC. FOR COMPUTATIONAL
LINGUISTICS WORKSHOP ON ETHICS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 53–59 (2017), http:/
/www.aclweb.org/anthology/W/W17/W17-1606 [https://perma.cc/KWN7-LKNT].
131. Ajunwa, supra note 15, at 1685–86.
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Rights Act of 1964, it was not until 1986 that the Supreme Court defined
sexual harassment as a form of unlawful sex discrimination.132 The Court
made the grounds for employer liability for harassment clear in a pair of
decisions in 1998, routinely referred to as Farrager-Ellerth.133 At base, the
approach to establishing employer liability for sexual harassment depends
on the nature of the harassment alleged and the identity of the alleged
harasser in relation to the alleged victim.134
There are two basic forms of prohibited sexual harassment: (1) quid pro
quo harassment and (2) hostile work environment harassment.135 Quid pro
quo harassment typically involves demands that make sexual conduct a
condition of employment, meaning that there is an express or implied causal
connection between submission to sexually oriented behavior and a tangible
job consequence.136 Hostile work environment harassment, in contrast,
involves language or conduct in the workplace that interferes with the
employee’s ability to work or creates an unbearable work environment.137
Whether or not an employer is liable for hostile work environment
harassment depends to some extent on whether the alleged harasser is a
supervisor and hence an agent of the employer or a co-worker of the alleged
victim.138
In identifying the grounds for employer liability, the Court in Ellerth
began with the Restatement (Second) of Agency, §219 (2), which dictates
that in cases where the agent is operating outside the “scope of employment”
as is the case with sexual harassment,139 the employer is not liable unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal
and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in

132. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
133. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
134. See Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: the Employers’
Paradox in Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment - A Proposed Way Out,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1539–48 (1999) (explaining the conditions necessary for
employers to be liable for sexual harassment).
135. Id. at 1540–41.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757 (“The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor
is not conduct within the scope of employment.”).
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accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.140
In cases involving supervisor harassment, the Court looked to
Subsection 219(2)(d) and the “aided in the agency relation” standard to
determine that employers may have “vicarious liability” both in cases where
there is a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor and in cases
without that tangible action subject to the affirmative defense created in the
Farragher/Ellerth cases.141
In contrast, when the alleged harasser is a coworker of the victim, the
Court acknowledged that the lower courts have uniformly used the
negligence standard to determine employer liability since those cases do not
involve a harasser that was aided in the harassment by his or her role as an
agent of the employer.142 As the EEOC explains, with respect to conduct
between co-workers, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual
harassment in the workplace where the employer (or his agents or
supervisory employees) “knew, or should have known about the harassment
and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action.”143
Perhaps the trickiest question in coworker harassment cases centers on
the meaning of knowledge—who knew and what does it mean to know? As
an initial matter, courts have concluded that there is no need to report to the
“correct” supervisor for the negligence standard to apply and that a report to
anyone in a supervisory capacity will suffice.144 In addition, the plaintiff
herself need not be the one to put the employer on notice about the co-worker
harassment, and the notice need not come through an official report or
grievance procedure.145 “Constructive knowledge” of coworker harassment
140. Id. at 758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §219(2) (1957)).
141. Id. at 765 (“An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages.”).
142. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (noting that lower federal courts had “uniformly judg[ed]
employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard”); Garcez v.
Freightliner Corp., 72 P.3d 78, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that, although the
Faragher/Ellerth defense cannot be used in claims of co-worker harassment, its principles are
embedded in the requirement that the plaintiff establish that the employer knew or should
have known of the harassing conduct (construing Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794,
803 (9th Cir. 2001)).
143. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/harassment
[https://perma.cc/A83D-EBHX] (last visited May 20, 2021).
144. Varner v. Nat’l Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Indeed, Title
VII defines employer to include any ‘agent’ of the employer.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
145. See, e.g., Flowers v. Honigman Miller Schwarz & Cohn, No. 04-71928, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9062, at *22 (E.D. Mich. May 16, 2005) (noting that “it is not necessary that the
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can support application of the negligence standard without an actual
affirmative report by the victim.146
However, proving “constructive knowledge” tends to be a steep uphill
battle for the plaintiff in a coworker harassment case. In the majority of
cases, courts find “constructive notice,” without a report by the victim, “only
when the acts of harassment are so egregious, numerous, and concentrated
as to add up to a campaign of harassment.”147 “Put differently, ‘a victim of
coworker harassment must show either actual knowledge on the part of the
employer or conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive as to constitute
constructive knowledge to the employer.’”148 Despite allowing for a
seemingly employee-friendly “constructive knowledge” standard, courts
applying this standard typically demand the existence of blatant and
outrageous harassment in order to impute knowledge to the employer.149 As
a result, commentators have referred to this “knew or should have known”
standard as an “employer-friendly” one since “it places the burden on the
plaintiff to prove that the employer engaged in wrongdoing that renders it
liable for the discriminatory harassment.”150 Others have called it the “seeno-evil defence” because “it could mean that the employer is virtually able

plaintiff herself put the employer on notice” when the employer knew or should have known
of the harassment) (cited in Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory In Sexual Harassment Law,
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 847, n.162 (2006)).
146. See, e.g., Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, 164 N.J. 38, 45 (2000) (considering whether “an
employer, having actual or constructive knowledge that co-employees are posting harassing,
retaliatory, and sometimes defamatory, messages about a co-employee on a bulletin board
used by the company’s employees, [has] a duty to prevent the continuation of such harassing
conduct”).
147. Rennard v. Woodworker’s Supply, Inc., 101 F. App’x 296, 304 (10th Cir. 2004). See
also Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)
(holding that “constructive notice . . . is established when the harassment was so severe and
pervasive that management reasonably should have known of it”); Sharp v. City of Houston,
164 F.3d 923, 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that an employer has constructive knowledge
of co-worker harassment only when someone “with remedial power over the harasser . . .
knew or should have known” of the harassing conduct) (cited in Lawton, supra note 145, at
847 n.162).
148. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions About Speech: Why the Free-Speech
Critique of Hostile Work Environment Harassment Is Wrong, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 391,
439–40 (2002) (quoting Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F. 3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir.
2002)).
149. Id. “[A]bsent notification, courts will find constructive knowledge only if harassment
is public and constant, or if the acts of harassment are ‘so egregious, numerous, and
concentrated’ that they amount to a ‘campaign’”) (citations omitted).
150. Lu-in Wang, When The Customer Is King: Employment Discrimination As Customer
Service when The Customer Is King: Employment Discrimination As Customer Service, 23
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 249, 260 (2016).
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to ignore the possibility of workplace harassment until it is reported.”151 As
a result, it is nearly impossible to satisfy the negligence standard of liability
absent a formal or informal report to management.152
How then does this employer-friendly standard fare when applied to a
case in which the employer was actively monitoring employee
communications for possible instances of inappropriate or harassing
conduct? In short, I propose – not well. Commentators have begun to
theorize about the impact of social media on the negligence standard for
coworker harassment. Imagining a scenario in which an employee posts
harassing comments on Facebook about another employee and a manager
who is “friends” with the harasser has access to this content, the argument is
as follows:
If the manager happens to see harassing comments or offensive
dialogue being exchanged among employees and does nothing, the
employer may later be accused of having knowledge of co-worker
harassment and failing to respond. Even if the manager never
actually saw the inappropriate content, the existence of the
friendship with the subordinate in and of itself may give an
enterprising plaintiff-employee the opportunity to claim that the
employer knew or should have known of the alleged
harassment.153
When employers utilize #MeTooBots to monitor employee
communications, they essentially forego the “knew or should have known”
defense that would have prevented liability absent an employee report.

151. Angela Duffy, Comparative Analysis of the Vicarious Liability of Employers in
Harassment Cases in the United Kingdom and the United States, COMMON L. WORLD REV.
(CLWR) 31 3 (254) (2002).
152. See Rennard v. Woodworker’s Supply, Inc., 101 F. Appx. 296, 304 (stating that the
employer has actual notice of harassment when the victim reports to “management-level
employees”).
153. Laura Thalacker & Kelly Kichline, Special Feature: Pitfall Potential: The Risks of
Social Media, 18 NEVADA LAWYER 16, 17–19 (2010). This type of argument has begun to
appear in other contexts including race discrimination claims under Title VI and tort cases
involving online child pornography. See e.g., Stafford v. George Wash. Univ., No. 18-cv2789 (CRC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94088, at *4 (D.D.C. June 5, 2019) (considering
constructive knowledge of environment of harassment and discrimination, in part, because
“the head coach, Munoz, “was aware of these racist postings because he was Facebook friends
with the tennis players and told the players that he monitored social media postings[.]”); Doe
v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (imputing knowledge
to defendant employer that employee was using his work computer to access child
pornography since an investigation of his computer (that should have been triggered by
reports) would have revealed the employee’s activities).
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Instead, by expressly claiming to monitor all employee communications to
detect inappropriate behaviors and harassment, they are adopting a system
that creates the very knowledge that the negligence standard requires.154 At
the very least, a plaintiff should be able to convincingly argue that the
employer “should have known” of the harassment since it employs a tool
that promises to unearth it.
However, as described above, the AI-based tools on which employers
rely for this monitoring are often functionally incapable of the task, may be
plagued by signal and bias problems, and, without a doubt fail to achieve a
100% accuracy rate. While the danger that the AI-based monitor will flag
benign communications causing problems for all of the employees involved
is a real one, there is also the significant danger that the tool fails to flag
significant harassment that it should have captured.
Imagine a case in which an employee routinely receives sexual emails
from a co-worker. The emails contain images and words but using
vernacular or a language on which the AI is not trained. The recipient of the
emails is distressed and embarrassed. Her work begins to suffer as she grows
fearful of opening her email and of seeing the sender in person. She,
however, does not report these communications to anyone both because she
is uncomfortable discussing them openly and because she assumes that
management is aware of them and unconcerned because she knows about the
AI-based monitoring and has received no word of a company investigation
or the like. In that case, the plaintiff could reasonably argue that an
affirmative report of the harassment to a manager is unnecessary to impute
knowledge and ultimately liability. She suffered under a coworker-created

154. In the one recent case that dealt with co-worker harassment in an online bulletin
board, the court, although focused primarily on whether the bulletin board was a part of the
workplace, had this to say about the potential for negligence liability for co-worker posts:
To repeat, employers do not have a duty to monitor private communications of
their employees; employers do have a duty to take effective measures to stop coemployee harassment when the employer knows or has reason to know that such
harassment is part of a pattern of harassment that is taking place in the workplace
and in settings that are related to the workplace.
Blakey, 164 N.J. at 62, 751 A.2d at 552 (2000). See also Donald P. Harris, Daniel B. Garrie,
Matthew J. Armstrong, Sexual Harassment: Limiting the Affirmative Defense in the Digital
Workplace, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 73, 76 (2005) (arguing that in cases where employers
have the capacity to monitor employee communications, the affirmative defense should be
modified to allow courts to “explore whether or not the defendant took reasonable steps to
monitor and block the offensive digital communications or whether the defendant can
articulate a rational reason for not utilizing readily available technology to prevent workplace
digital harassment”).
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hostile work environment that the employer should have known about and
yet nothing was done to stop it. Absent the #MeTooBot, the employer could
have easily argued that it had no knowledge (actual or constructive) of the
harassment and thus could not be liable. Use of the AI-based monitor turns
a case that would have been an almost automatic dismissal under the
negligence standard into a problematic legal case for the employer.
2.

Impact on Employee Protection Against Retaliation

Much like the potential for increased liability for employers using AIbased harassment monitors, the unintended legal consequences of
#MeTooBots may be equally problematic for employees who are victims of
harassing communications (despite being the technology’s raison d’être).
Title VII and its related doctrine generally prohibit retaliation against victims
of unlawful harassment who report the conduct to management along with
bystanders who take an active role in opposing such unlawful conduct.
However, absent some form of “opposition” or “participation” conduct, a
victim of harassment receives no legal protection against retaliation.155
When the human reporter is removed from the process of identifying
harassment, the victim may lose both her voice and agency in the process as
well as her protection against retaliatory conduct.
Imagine the following scenario: A company’s AI-based monitor
identifies inappropriate language (per the rules on which it was trained) in
several email communications between a supervisor and an employee. The
bot reports the communications to Human Resources, which commences an
investigation. Management ultimately disciplines the supervisor by sending
him to sexual harassment training and moving him to a different department.
His team is extremely upset, having seen him as a great manager and mentor.
During the investigation process, the victim’s name is leaked. Without
knowing much else about the incident, the victim’s team turns on her. She
is shunned by co-workers, left off team e-mails and meetings, and generally
ignored. She gains a reputation as a “complainer,” which, in turn, may
ultimately impact her future assignments and even promotions. Such
behavior might seem to be obviously in violation of Title VII’s prohibition
on retaliation but, as this Section will describe, because of the way retaliation
protection is structured, the victim in this scenario may be treated by courts
as legally helpless.
Title VII prohibits retaliation as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
155. See infra text accompanying notes 160–71.
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discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.156
The statute makes retaliation protection available for two types of
conduct: “opposition conduct” and “participation conduct.”157 “Opposition
conduct” includes internal complaints and can include complaints that are
written or verbal, formal or informal, proactively made by an employee or in
response to a question by management.158 In contrast, “participation
conduct” pertains exclusively to an employee’s participation in an
investigation by the EEOC, a proceeding in court, or the employee’s own
filing of charges or suit.159 To prevail on a retaliation claim, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that he (1) engaged in a statutorily protected activity or
expression (e.g., a complaint of harassment); (2) that he suffered an adverse
action by the employer (e.g., promotion denial); and (3) that there was a
causal link between the protected action or expression and the adverse action
(the short time between complaint and termination often provides this causal
link without any other evidence of causation).160 In the scenario laid out
156. 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–3(a).
157. See Leora Eisenstadt and Deanna Geddes, Suppressed Anger, Retaliation Doctrine,
and Workplace Culture, 20 UNIV. OF PA. J. OF BUS. L. 147, 156 (2018) (citing Crawford v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, at 850 (2009)
[t]he Title VII anti-retaliation provision has two clauses, making it ‘an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.’ The one is known as the ‘opposition clause,’
the other as the ‘participation clause. . . .
158. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850; see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 15 (2011) (finding that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to a
complaint, whether oral or written).
159. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850 (describing the process by which an employee may
bring a statutory claim against an employer).
160. Eisenstadt and Geddes, supra note 157, at 157 (citing Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Timing
Isn’t Everything: Establishing a Title VII Retaliation Prima Facie Case After University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 69 SMU L. REV. 143, 152 (2016); see also
EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
to find a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence: 1) plaintiff engaged in activity protected by
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above (and in most #MeTooBot cases), the “participation clause” is
irrelevant because there has been no charge or lawsuit filed and the sole
investigation was internal.161 The victim would thus have to rely on the
“opposition clause” and attempt to demonstrate some form of opposition
activity. Herein lies the problem in AI-discovered cases.
The Supreme Court in recent years has dramatically expanded the
meaning of “opposition conduct” under Title VII and other related
employment statutes. In 2008, the Court endorsed the conclusion that 42
U.S.C. §1981 includes an implied prohibition on retaliation in a case
involving a plaintiff who faced retaliation because he complained to
managers about the dismissal of a coworker,162 impliedly concluding that
“opposition conduct” includes complaints about another employee’s
mistreatment, not only your own.163 One year later, the Court’s decision in
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County
concluded that “opposition conduct” also includes responding to questions
as part of an internal investigation as opposed to only encompassing
affirmative complaints.164 The Court pragmatically noted that “nothing in
the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.”165 Finally,
in 2011, in a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case, the Court concluded
that affirmative complaints were protected activity for retaliation purposes
whether
they
were
in
written
or
verbal
form.166
Title VII; 2) plaintiff’s exercise of his civil rights was known by the defendant;
3) that, thereafter, the defendant took an employment action adverse to the
plaintiff; and 4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.
161. See Matthew W. Green, Jr., What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness? Rejecting
a Case Law-Centered Approach to Title VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L. REV.
759, 765, n.27 (2014) (“Participation in an employer’s internal investigation into allegations
of discrimination conducted apart from a formal charge filed with an administrative agency
does not typically fall within the scope of participation clause protection.”).
162. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008).
163. The lower courts have followed suit. In 2010, the First Circuit concluded that
opposition conduct includes accompanying another employee to Human Resources to make
a complaint and speaking to the alleged harasser on someone else’s behalf. Collazo v. BristolMyers Squib Mfg., 617 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2010).
164. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846, 851 (2009).
165. Id.
166. Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14.
To fall within the scope of the antiretaliation provision, a complaint must be
sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light
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What the Court has not done, however, is expand “opposition conduct”
to uncommunicated or silent opposition. The only real discussion of the
subject by the Court can be found in Justice Alito’s concurrence in Crawford
in which he wrote specifically to oppose the extension of the doctrine beyond
the facts of the case before the Court: “the Court’s holding does not and
should not extend beyond employees who testify in internal investigations
or engage in analogous purposive conduct.”167 In laying out his position,
Justice Alito examined Random House’s definitions of the term “oppose,”
noting that most of the definitions include the taking of affirmative action,
but that the fourth definition, which the Court mentioned in dicta, “goes
further, defining ‘oppose’ to mean ‘to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion.’
Thus, this definition embraces silent opposition.”168 Justice Alito wrote to
clarify that the Court’s decision should not extend to silent opposition and
cautioned that such an expansion would have problematic implications.169
A number of commentators have explored this question in detail. In
commenting on the Crawford decision, Alex Long concludes that the Court
is generally looking for affirmative action directed to the employer when it
considers “opposition conduct.”
Nearly all of the examples the Court used in attempting to explain
what qualifies as “opposing” unlawful conduct involved
expressions of disapproval communicated directly to the
employer. From providing a disapproving account to the
employer of an employee’s behavior, to communicating a belief to
the employer that the employer’s conduct was unlawful, to
refusing to obey the employer’s orders, the examples the Court
relied upon involved expressions of disapproval. . . . [T]he Court’s
sympathy is premised on the assumption that the employee
expresses her belief to the employer that discrimination has
occurred. This is certainly the view of Justices Alito and Thomas,
who concurred in the judgment but argued that the term
“opposition” should include only “active and purposive” conduct.
In sum, Crawford does not provide much comfort to employees
who do not openly express disapproval of an employer’s actions

of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and
a call for their protection. This standard can be met, however, by oral complaints,
as well as by written ones.
167. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 281 (Alito, J. concurring).
168. Id. at 282.
169. Id. at 282–83.
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to the employer.170
Matthew Green agrees with this assessment of the Court’s view in
Crawford, and notes that this reading of the provision “as requiring some
form of expression versus merely holding an opinion is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s characterization of a retaliation claim under Title VII as a
conduct-based claim.”171 “[U]nlike the substantive provisions of the statute,
which protect individuals because of who they are, i.e., their status, the antiretaliation provision ‘seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what
they do, i.e., their conduct.’”172
Nevertheless, Green argues for a broader standard for “opposition
conduct” than Alito and Thomas’s “purposive conduct.” He proposes a
hypothetical in which a victim of harassment who does not want to report it
to management instead vents to a coworker. The coworker then reports the
conduct to management. If the victim is later terminated in retaliation for
venting to a coworker, that adverse action would nevertheless be lawful
under the “purposive conduct” standard.173 Insisting that the venting to the
coworker should be protected conduct, Green argues that “[w]hat matters is
whether the opposition reaches the employer’s attention and whether the
employer discriminates on the basis of the opposition.”174 He would thus
expand the meaning of “opposition conduct” to include affirmative action
that is indirectly or unintentionally communicated to the employer.
Unfortunately for victims of AI-detected harassment, neither the Alito
standard nor Green’s proposed expanded standard would likely offer
protection. Under Alito’s “purposive conduct” approach, the victim of AIdetected harassment in our hypothetical is devoid of options—she may or
may not have been the victim of actionable harassment but importantly, she
has done nothing to express her opposition to the underlying conduct. In
fact, she may not even have had the chance to express opposition before the
AI monitor discovered and reported the inappropriate communications. That
she faced ridicule with potentially long-term impacts on her career may not
help her case. If the court is looking for conduct-based opposition, this

170. Alex Long, Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 525,
556–57 (2011).
171. Matthew W. Green, Jr. Express Yourself: Striking a Balance Between Silence and
Active, Purposive Opposition Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 28 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 107, 126 (2010).
172. Id. at 127.
173. Id. at 110–11.
174. Id. at 111.
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victim will find herself unprotected by the retaliation doctrines.175
Somewhat less obvious is the victim’s fate under Green’s proposed
expanded standard, which would include opposition that is “indirectly and
unintentionally expressed to an employer.”176 While this is a commonsense
expansion, it would still likely leave the victim of AI-detected harassment
unprotected.177 In our scenario, the victim has not engaged in any conduct at
all. Her opposition (if she opposes the conduct at all) is silent at the point in
time when her name is leaked. She may not have wanted to report the
conduct to management, to a coworker or even to a family member.
Nevertheless, she was the victim of the technology’s ability to detect and
report without her cooperation at all.
It is possible that a thoughtful, nuanced court may view the totality of
circumstances in these cases and find a means of protecting the AI-detected
harassment victim. For example, although the prohibition on retaliation is
discussed in a separate provision of Title VII, the underlying harassing
comments detected by the AI along with the victim’s treatment after her
name was leaked may all be considered to be part of the unlawful
harassment.178 As the EEOC notes, “Harassment becomes unlawful where
175. As Green points out, the lower courts have largely endorsed this “purposive conduct”
standard as well. See Green, supra note 171, at 133-34 (discussing Pitrolo v. Cnty. of
Buncombe, No. 07-2145, 2009 WL 1010634 (4th Cir. 2009) and Ackel v. Nat’l
Communications, 339 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting retaliation protection to plaintiffs
who complained to family members or non-supervisory employees who then reported to
management)).
176. Green, supra note 171, at 111.
177. There is a second, ironic way in which the AI makes victims of harassment more
vulnerable to retaliation. Under the doctrine known as the “Objectively Reasonable Belief”
doctrine, endorsed in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001) (per curiam), for retaliatory conduct to be unlawful,
the complaining party must have an objectively reasonable belief that the practices he or she
opposed (which gave rise to the retaliation) were unlawful. See Boles et al. supra note 115,
at 168–69. When deciding whether that belief was “objectively reasonable,” the court does
not consider the “good faith” or actual belief of the reporter but rather to whether a court
would consider the reported behavior to be unlawful discrimination or harassment. Id. at 169
(citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71; Satterwhite v. City of Hous., 602 F. App’x 585, 588 (5th
Cir. 2015)). When applied to a case of AI-detected harassment, an obvious problem arises.
If the AI-based monitor flags and reports communications that it is trained to view as
inappropriate but that do not rise to the level of unlawful harassment (which may happen
because the communications are not sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to meet the standard),
and the victim of the inappropriate communications is nevertheless retaliated against as a
result of the AI’s flag and resulting investigation, the victim cannot claim unlawful retaliation.
If the underlying conduct does not meet the standard for unlawful discrimination as
interpreted by a court, the resulting retaliation is perfectly lawful.
178. See Brake, supra note 12, at 21 (contending that “[r]ecognizing retaliation as a form
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1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condition of continued
employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a work
environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile,
or abusive.”179 Moreover, the EEOC identifies that harassment includes,
“offensive jokes, slurs, epithets or name calling, physical assaults or threats,
intimidation, ridicule or mockery, insults or put-downs, offensive objects or
pictures, and interference with work performance” and the victim of
harassment may be “anyone affected by the offensive conduct” even if there
is no “economic injury to, or discharge of, the victim.”180 In the hypothetical
above, the victim of inappropriate digital communications, even if not
themselves unlawful, may be understood to be a victim of unlawful
harassment once she is forced to endure the ostracism and negative treatment
associated with her name being leaked as part of the investigation. A skilled
plaintiff’s lawyer may be able to frame the subsequent retaliatory conduct as
harassment in and of itself without relying on the retaliation provision and
its narrow approach that protects only those who have taken purposeful
action to protest the harassment.
Unfortunately, the thoughtful and nuanced court needed to make this
leap is increasingly rare. As a number of scholars have highlighted, many
courts, focused on the numerous doctrines created to assess claims of
harassment and retaliation, become mired in parsing the technical details of
the claims and essentially miss the forest for the trees.181 As a practical
matter, it is far more likely that both the plaintiff’s attorney and the court
of discrimination, one that is implicitly banned by general proscriptions of discrimination,
pushes the boundaries of dominant understandings of discrimination in useful and productive
ways”); see also Brief of Employment Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 5, Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No.
12-484) (contending “[a] long line of cases confirms that when Congress uses the word
‘discriminate’ that term encompasses retaliation”).
179. EEOC, supra note 7070 (emphasis added).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. See Sandra Sperino, Into the Weeds: Modern Discrimination Law, 95 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1077, 1078–79 (2020) (critiquing the overreliance on court-created frameworks,
roadmaps, and “ancillary doctrines or subdoctrines” that capture “an ever-increasing amount
of judicial attention” as being ineffective and “underestimat[ing] the complexity of the
modern workplace . . . ”); see also Marcia McCormick, Let’s Pretend that Federal Courts
Aren’t Hostile to Discrimination Claims, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7 (2015) (describing
“decisionmaking [sic] heuristics for employment discrimination cases” that lead to
increasingly narrow rulings); Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination
Law, 56 ST. LOUIS L.J. 111, 113-114 (2011) (discussing the way in which courts rely on
“shortcut” doctrines that unfairly skew towards the defendant “at the expense of a more
holistic assessment of all properly-considered evidence against the backdrop of the
overarching question posed by the relevant legislation: did employment discrimination
‘because’ of an unlawful consideration occur?”).
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reviewing the claims will identify the negative treatment as retaliation,
becoming entangled in the doctrines on opposition and participation conduct
and finding that the silent victim of AI-detected harassment falls between the
cracks of these doctrines.
3.

Impact on Victim Voice

Beyond exposing victims of harassment to “lawful” retaliation, AIbased harassment monitors have the potential to create significant ethical
problems with respect to a victim’s agency and voice. In their recent article
on “hushing contracts,” David Hoffman and Erik Lampmann explore the use
of non-disclosure agreements in sexual misconduct cases and describe one
of the costs of such agreements as “the deprivation of survivors’ ability to
openly and honestly talk about their experiences” or, in essence, their ability
to “‘come out’ as survivors.”182 The use of #MeTooBots, however wellintended, creates the equally problematic flip side of this harm—it deprives
victims of the ability not to speak.
In the typical workplace sexual harassment case, a man or woman may
be the victim of multiple instances of harassing comments or conduct over a
period of time or one particularly horrible instance before he or she decides
to report the behavior. Either way, it is likely an agonizing decision. In
addition to the fear of concrete retaliation in the form of demotion, denial of
opportunities, or outright termination, the victim fears losing the reputation
she has worked hard to build, being viewed as a complainer or problem
employee, forfeiting political capital she had intended to use elsewhere, and
being seen henceforth through the lens of this complaint rather than the
workplace successes she has achieved.183 The choice to speak up may be
based on her inability to function in the workplace otherwise, her desire to
182. David Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U.L. REV. 165,
179 (2019).
183. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form
Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 51–52 (2003)
(describing numerous reasons why victims fail to report harassment, including fear of
retaliation, ostracization, and alienation from mentors and coworkers, “or because ‘calling
attention to offensive behavior reinforces stereotypes of women as victims’” (quoting Nina
Burleigh & Stephanie B. Goldberg, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Law Firms,
A.B.A. J. 46, 48 (1989) and citing Denise H. Lach & Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs,
Sociological Perspectives on Sexual Harassment and Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 J.
VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 102, 111 (1993) (describing survey data about job consequences for
filing sexual harassment complaints))); Jan Salisbury et al., Counseling Victims of Sexual
Harassment, 23 PSYCHOTHERAPY 316, 319 (1986) (noting that “the occurrence of physical
and mental symptoms is dramatically higher [for those who file formal complaints] then [sic]
for those who do not”).
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help others avoid such treatment, or her desire to reclaim the power that the
harassment has sought to steal from her.184
Likewise, the choice to remain silent may be a deliberate one, based on
knowledge born of watching those who spoke out before. It may result from
life circumstances that make it impossible to risk job loss or income
reduction.185 It may be a considered response to the beginnings of a
campaign of harassment that are not yet severe enough to be taken seriously
by the employer or courts but if left to fester, might be actionable and better
to report later.186 It might even be a recognition of the power the victim has
in the organization and the desire to maintain that power to assist other
women and disadvantaged groups.187 Regardless of the why, the act of
staying silent is, without doubt, an act of agency or self-direction. The use
of #MeTooBots to monitor, detect, and report harassment deprives victims
of this agency. Ironically, again, an effort to help (typically female) victims
of harassment, this technology has the potential to visit upon victims another
abuse. As Linda Mills notes, “Feminist political practice - even in the name
184. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F.
22, 24 (2018) (describing reasons why women speak up regarding harassment); Vicki Schultz,
Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/open-statementon-sexual-harassment-from-employment-discrimination-law-scholars/ [https:/ /perma.cc/9E8
Q-SKMM].
185. See Ben Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in Women’s Workplaces, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 245, 248 (1986) (“The social fact that women need employment that may not
be abundantly available tends to create a willingness to tolerate persistently abusive
conditions of work . . .”).
186. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating
the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s AntiRetaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1158 (2007)
One of the biggest problems with maintaining the objectively reasonable standard
in these cases is that it puts employees in the unenviable position of having to
decide whether to report an offending co-worker and run the risk of termination,
or keep quiet and run the risk of having to endure working in a hostile
environment, regardless of whether that environment meets the Harris standard
for actionable harassment.
187. See Heather McLaughlin et al., Sexual Harassment, Workplace Authority, and the
Paradox of Power, 77(4) AM. SOC. REV. 625, 641 (2012) (describing findings that
female supervisors are more, rather than less, likely to be harassed . . . Although
women supervisors’ authority is legitimated by their employer, sexual
harassment functions, in part, as a tool to enforce gender-appropriate
behavior. . . . When women’s power is viewed as illegitimate or easily
undermined, co-workers, clients, and supervisors appear to employ harassment
as an ‘equalizer’ against women supervisors, consistent with research showing
that harassment is less about sexual desire than about control and domination.
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of gender warfare - should not mimic patriarchy through either the use of
threat tactics or the inattention to individual desire.”188
To explain the abuse of voice deprivation, I turn to the literature on
domestic violence and sexual assault and the rise and critique of mandatory
referral and mandatory arrest and prosecution laws to combat the failure to
take such offenses seriously. In recent years, spurred by campus activism
around gender violence at colleges and universities, there have been a “series
of ‘mandatory referral’ laws proposed in state legislatures and the United
States House of Representatives.”189 Responding to the critique that schools
fail to properly investigate and adjudicate claims of sexual violence, these
laws mandate referral of school reports of such violence to local law
enforcement for prosecution.190 This recent effort parallels a similar
approach in domestic violence law. In the late 1970’s and 1980’s, in
response to case after case of police ignoring horrific abuse of women by
their husbands, in jurisdictions “[t]hroughout the country, either legislatures
imposed or police departments implemented policies requiring arrests in
domestic violence cases whenever police had probable cause to do so.”191 In
addition, jurisdictions began to respond to the problem of prosecutorial
discretion, since “prosecutors had also routinely chosen not to pursue cases
against the few perpetrators of violence who police had actually arrested.”192
In response, they implemented “no-drop prosecution” policies in which
“prosecutors would not dismiss criminal charges in otherwise winnable cases
simply because the victim was not interested in, or was even adamantly
opposed to, pursuing the case.”193
Much like the development of #MeTooBots, the enactment and
implementation of these laws and policies aimed to protect victims (most
often women) who suffer abuse of some kind and who the system has failed
to protect. “Mandatory referral” laws endeavor to help institutions identify

188. Linda Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 568 (1999).
189. Alexandra Brodsky, Against Taking Rape “Seriously”: The Case Against Mandatory
Referral Laws for Campus Gender Violence, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 131, 133, 139 n.46–
49 (2018) (citing Safe Campus Act, H.R. 3404, 114th Cong. (2015) and describing bills in at
least eleven states, four of which have become law).
190. Id. at 138–40.
191. Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009); see also Aya
Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 649–50 (discussing
feminist scholars’ critique of mandatory prosecution and similar policies that “often inure to
the great detriment of abuse survivors”).
192. Id. at 10.
193. Id. at 11–12.
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and punish wrong doers, identify victims to provide resources and support,
and collect data that fuels future policies aimed at deterrence.194 “Mandatory
arrest” laws similarly seek to keep women safe.195 The approach in all these
cases to the problem of a failed system, however, is to supplant the victim’s
agency and decision-making power with that of the system itself. And as is
also the case in workplace sexual harassment, the result of these wellmeaning interventions is to visit a different kind of abuse on those they seek
to protect.
Critiques of “mandatory referral,” “mandatory arrest,” and “no-drop
prosecution” policies center on the impact these approaches have on victim
voice and agency.196 In the case of “mandatory referral” rules for campus
sexual assault, critics argue that the unintended consequences can be both
physical and psychological. “For students who disclose their victimization,
these policies infringe their autonomy (that is, self-determination) and
aggravate the psychological and/or physical harm caused by the violence
itself.”197 The ability to control one’s fate is essential to identity, to a victim’s
self-confidence, and ability to perform elsewhere in her life. “An
institutional response that overrides the survivor’s own preferences also calls
into question a woman’s judgment, and thereby produces additional
harm.”198 In addition, when the system deprives victims of agency, it
assumes that the same response is equally effective in all cases regardless of
the context, the victim and perpetrator’s identities and roles, and the like.
“Creating space for choice honors the differences between women,
recognizing that race, class, sexual orientation, disability status, and a
194. Merle H. Weiner, A Principled and Legal Approach to Title IX Reporting, 85 TENN.
L. REV. 71, 82–83 (2017).
195. Mills, supra note 188188, at 563
[A]t one level, the system clearly colluded with the batterer and replicated the
violence endemic to patriarchy by failing to take the victim’s complaints
seriously. . . . Many advocates of mandatory arrest and prosecution have argued
that mandatory policies force state actors to treat crimes against women in the
same manner in which they treat other crimes.
196. While some critics use the terms autonomy and agency interchangeably, Goodmark
cautions that the term “autonomy” itself carries some “philosophical baggage” because
women “by virtue of their subordinated status as victims of a patriarchal system, are rarely
able to exercise the sort of autonomy contemplated by philosophers” and notes that some have
instead chosen to use “agency, which captures the key features of autonomy-self-definition
and self-direction-but recognizes how social construction delimits the choices available to
women.” Goodmark, supra note 191, at 24 (citing Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to
Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 823–24
(1999)).
197. Weiner, supra note 194194 at 87.
198. Id. at 93.
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multiplicity of other variables color how a particular woman might want to
respond to a particular incidence of violence at a particular moment in
time.”199 In the context of domestic violence cases, critics of “mandatory
arrest and prosecution” rules highlight the impact of the loss of autonomy on
the victim’s healing. “No intervention that takes power away from the
survivor can possibly foster her recovery, no matter how much it appears to
be in her immediate best interest.”200 This revictimization can be
psychological and physical. “[B]ypassing a victim’s assessment of her own
needs, safety and otherwise, can be lethal.”201
Although there are numerous differences between the criminal justice
system’s approach to domestic violence and employers’ responses to
harassment, many of these critiques apply to the use of AI-based monitors
for workplace sexual harassment. As one scholar notes in the domestic
violence context, “If, as most scholars agree, domestic violence is
characterized by a power imbalance between the parties, restoring power to
women who have been battered should be a priority when crafting domestic
violence law and policy.”202 Similarly, sexual harassment is itself an
expression of power.203 An employer’s investigation of possible harassment
should acknowledge this and not impose a secondary deprivation of power
on its victims. The loss of agency in this context, as with campus sexual
assault and domestic violence, ignores the differences between individual
victims and between instances of sexual harassment. It has the potential to
cause even greater harm both psychologically and financially. A woman
who chooses not to report harassment in the workplace may be considering
a multitude of factors in making that choice, and the AI-based detector
should not supplant her judgment.204
199. Id. at 90.
200. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 133 (1997).
201. Rebecca Fialk and Tamara Mitchel, Jurisprudence: Due Process Concerns For The
Underrepresented Domestic Violence Victim, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 206 (2005).
202. Goodmark, supra note 191, at 29.
203. See generally Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra note 184
184(describing harassment as a way for men to pin women as inferior).
204. Notwithstanding this problem of victim voice in the harassment context, I
acknowledge that the differences in context between the criminal justice system and the
workplace are sufficiently large that a different calculus may be necessary. For example,
although police and prosecution policies and practices may enable domestic violence and
sexual assault to some extent, those institutions do not exert the same level of day-to-day
control over victims’ lives as employers exert over their employees. In contrast, the
employment relationship is what provides the opportunity and context for an employee to be
subject to sexual harassment and, as such, the employer may bear a greater burden in its
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In Ifeoma Ajunwa’s recent article exploring AI’s potentials and pitfalls
in combating bias, she urges consideration of the sometimes-unpredictable
ways in which the technology impacts society.
What elements of the social world does a new technology make
particularly salient that went relatively unnoticed before? What
features of human activity or of the human condition does a
technological change foreground, emphasize, or problematize?
And what are the consequences for human freedom of making this
aspect more important, more pervasive, or more central than it was
before?205
Here, the technology does not emphasize an unnoticed element; instead,
it eliminates one—the human reporter. Aiming to respond to the problem of
fear-based underreporting of sexual harassment, proponents of #MeTooBots
offer to replace her role entirely. Unfortunately, and ironically, in doing so,
it leaves the victim of harassment potentially unprotected against retaliatory
conduct and deprives her of the choice to speak up or stay silent, visiting an
additional abuse on already victimized individual. In attempting to alleviate
the harm caused by workplace harassment, the technology may inadvertently
expose victims to more of it.
4.

Impact on Organizational Culture

As is often the case with AI in the workplace, the intention behind its
use and the results in reality are not always aligned. Ajunwa refers to this as
the “Paradox of Automation.”206 In the hiring context, “the trend of hiring
eradication. In addition, the employer needs to consider not only the employee who is the
target of the particular instance of harassment but also the numerous other employees who
may be negatively impacted by it either because they also operate within the hostile work
environment created by the harasser or because the victim, while choosing not to report to
management, may share her anger, fear, and perception of injustice with her co-workers,
creating a culture of discontent. See Eisenstadt & Geddes, supra note 157157, at 182–86
(discussing suppressed anger and negative workplace outcomes). As a result, it is plausible
that an employer may be more concerned with the overall workplace culture implications of
a failure to identify instances of harassment than it is with a single employee’s agency and
power in choosing to report or stay silent.
205. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
206. Ajunwa, supra note 15, at 1673
The automation of decision-making processes via machine learning algorithmic
systems presents itself as a legal paradox. On one hand, such automation is often
an attempt to prevent unlawful discrimination, but on the other hand, there is
evidence that algorithmic decision-making processes may thwart the purposes of
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by algorithm grew out of a cottage industry of tech start-ups seeking to help
diversify Silicon Valley” by aiming to reduce the power of implicit bias,
which is often seen as an unavoidable component of human decisionmaking.207 However, as Ifeoma Ajunwa, Stephanie Bornstein, and others
point out, the use of AI in hiring and workplace management, in fact, ends
up undermining the anti-discrimination protections that are available.208 As
is described in the prior sections, the same may be true for #MeTooBots—
the technology is marketed as a means of protecting against the problems of
workplace sexual harassment but can end up exposing employers to a
heightened risk of liability; it is promoted as a solution to the underreporting
of harassment due to fear of retaliation but can, in reality, make victims more
vulnerable to retaliation without legal protection. The paradoxes abound.
This reality, however, is perhaps most prominent when considering the
technology’s potential impact on workplace culture.
Proponents of AI-based harassment monitors argue that their use can
help combat “toxic workplaces” proposing that companies, “armed with this
technology, . . . can protect employees, the company, and the culture from
malicious employees who would otherwise be toxic to the workforce.”209
Paradoxically, use of these monitors have the potential to sow distrust, create
a culture of fear, and rather than eliminate harassers, move them into other,
more private but equally destructive venues.
If, as I argue above, the use of #MeTooBots exacerbates the problem of
retaliation against victims of harassment by exposing them to potentially
awful retaliatory actions, the result for workplace culture is problematic as
well. Imagine being the coworker of an employee who was the victim of AIdetected harassment. The employee who made the harassing comments is
disciplined and quietly sent to online training. In the meantime, the victim’s
name leaks. You look on as your coworker, who endured harassing conduct
online but did not speak out about it, is removed from team projects and
increasingly isolated. If management consults the legal department, they are
rightly told that there is very little risk of legal liability for retaliation.
Without realizing it, you absorb the impact of your coworker’s treatment.
You begin to understand that management is watching all the time, harassing
conduct is dealt with quietly or secretly, complaints are not valued, and
antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and may
instead serve to reproduce inequalities at scale.
207. Bornstein, supra note 45, at 523.
208. See generally Bornstein, supra note 45 (noting numerous problems associated with
anti-discriminatory algorithms); Ajunwa, supra note 15 (discussing problematic features that
contradict goals of equal opportunity in employment) .
209. AWARE, supra note 3.
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retaliation is tolerated or even encouraged. You then talk with other
coworkers about this reality, sharing your observations and impacting their
views of management. This process, in fact, creates the toxic workplace
culture employers aim to combat. Rather than magically fixing the
organization’s culture by identifying the “malicious employee,” the use of
AI-based monitors allows for the slow creep of fear, distrust, and suppressed
anger to infect the workplace as a whole.210
In addition, commentators who critique this technology as being
invasive of employee privacy or “Orwellian” may, in fact, be highlighting
another problematic impact on workplace culture. The increase in employee
monitoring by #MeTooBots will likely impact employee health—both
psychological and physical—and overall well-being, which can be deeply
detrimental to the workplace culture. Several studies have begun to
demonstrate the detrimental physical effects of workplace monitoring. For
example,
[a] study by the Department of Industrial Engineering at the
University of Wisconsin has shown that the introduction of intense
employee monitoring at seven AT&T-owned companies led to a
twenty-seven percent increase in occurrences of pain or stiffness
in the shoulders, a twenty three percent increase in occurrences of
neck pressure, and a twenty-one percent increase in back pain.211
Even before the increase in digital monitoring of workers, studies
demonstrated the pernicious effects of over-monitoring of a workforce.
“When workers are monitored too closely, when monitoring is used to
enforce difficult work pacing, and when workers feel spied on, such
supervisory activities can apparently cause strong dissatisfaction. In turn,
dissatisfaction with supervisory practices may negatively influence general

210. See generally Eisenstadt & Geddes, supra note 157 (describing the impact of
suppressed anger on the workplace as a whole).
211. See Eisenstadt, Data Analytics, supra note 53, at 464 n.75 (2019) (quoting Simon
Head, Big Brother Goes Digital, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 24, 2018), http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/2018/05/24/big-brother-goes-digital/ [https://perma.cc/Q4H7-NUQC]
(citing National Workrights Institute, Electronic Monitoring: A Poor Solution to Management
Problems (2017), https://www.workrights.org/nwi_privacy_comp_monitoring_poor_solutio
n.html [https://perma.cc/N37F-WLDA]) (citing Patricia Sanchez Abril et al., Blurred
Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J.
63, 69 (2012) (describing negative effects of workplace monitoring); FREDERICK S. LANE III,
THE NAKED EMPLOYEE: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS COMPROMISING WORK-PLACE PRIVACY 11–16
(2003)); Maureen L. Ambrose et al., Electronic Performance Monitoring: A Consideration of
Rights, in MANAGERIAL ETHICS: MORAL MANAGEMENT OF PEOPLE AND PROCESS 61, 69–72
(Marshall Schminke ed., 1998).
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job satisfaction and life satisfaction.”212 While companies have, for decades,
put employees on notice that their IT departments are monitoring digital
communications on company servers, it is quite different to understand that
a machine learning system with far greater data-monitoring capabilities is
reviewing all emails, chats, texts, calls, and meeting transcripts. The
knowledge that monitoring on this level is not merely a risk but an actuality
will likely lead to the job dissatisfaction and overall negative workplace
culture results warned of in prior research.213
Lastly, when employees begin to understand what the AI monitor is and
can do, they may simply move their harassing conduct elsewhere or alter
their communications to circumvent its “rules.” The existence of this
monitoring does not alleviate the problem of harassment. In fact, it may
move it from the digital sphere where it will be automatically detected to the
sometimes more damaging sphere of in-person private interaction, that will
again necessitate a human report. Again here, the #MeTooBot would not fix
the toxic workplace culture; it might instead simply move that toxicity from
the computer back to the office.
IV. PROPOSALS: EMPLOYER CONSIDERATIONS & LEGAL REFORMS
This Article has catalogued the ways in which #MeTooBots or AI212. Jeffrey M. Stanton, Traditional and Electronic Monitoring from an Organizational
Justice Perspective, 15 J. BUS. & PSYCH. 129, 130 (2000) (citing A.G. Bedeian & L.D.
Marbert L. D., Individual Differences in Self-Perception and The Job-Life Satisfaction
Relationship, J. OF SOC. PSYCH., 109, 111–118 (1979), T.I. Chacko, Job And Life
Satisfactions: A Causal Analysis Of Their Relationships, ACAD. OF MGMT. J., 26, 163–169
(1983); see also John Chalykoff and Thomas A Kochan, Computer-Aided Monitoring: Its
Influence on Employee Job Satisfaction and Turnover, 42:4 PERS. PSYCH. 807, 807 (1989)
(showing that, for some employees, negative effects of monitoring were inherent; for others,
its negative impact could be mitigated by attention to feedback/performance appraisal
processes); see generally Brown, supra note 53 (contending that workplace monitoring
already threatens equity for women in the workplace).
213. Relatedly, if the machine learning tools begin to gather sufficient data, they may
begin to find digital communications that are seen as precursors to harassing conduct or
comments, identifying words or phrases that are statistically correlated with later harassing
comments. In effect, the bots may begin to identify workers as “harassment risks” even before
any objectionable communications have been detected. They will predict harassment before
it occurs. While this is a tantalizing notion, as evidenced by James de Haan’s argument in
favor of AI as a prophylactic, it has deeply problematic implications for workplace culture
and employees’ trust in the system by which they are being evaluated. See James de Haan,
Preventing #MeToo: Artificial Intelligence, the Law, and Prophylactics, 38 LAW & INEQ. 69,
73 (2020) (“This paper explores a deceptively obvious solution to human error; [sic] removing
the human.”). The creation of a “Minority Report Workplace” is not an outcome that connotes
healthy, happy workers.
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based harassment monitors may impact employer liability, employee
vulnerability to retaliation, victim agency, and workplace culture generally.
It is a fairly grim story. Nonetheless, my intention here is not to warn off
employers from ever using machine learning in the workplace. That would
be a foolhardy goal since the train has likely already left the station. The
ability to absorb and digest massive quantities of data and to use that data to
predict and act on worker behavior is too tantalizing an innovation to ignore.
My aim, instead, is to propose alternate uses of machine learning technology
that takes into account legal and practical implications and, frankly, makes
better, more productive use of the benefits of AI. In addition, assuming
employers continue to move forward with #MeTooBots, I propose doctrinal
considerations that courts should undertake given the rather dramatic impact
this technology may have on the law.
A. Employer Proposals
As an initial matter, it is important to point out that the problem with
#MeTooBots that this Article has discussed is not the ability to detect
harassment in digital communications. Rather, the problems emerge from
(1) overconfidence in the AI’s ability to detect all harassing communications
given the technology’s inadequate functionality214 and (2) the automatic
reporting of problematic communications to in-house counsel or Human
Resources. It is these problems that give rise to both increased liability for
employers who “should have known” about harassment given the constant
monitoring and decreased retaliation protection and loss of agency for
victims whose identities may be reported without any purposive conduct on
their parts. Given this reality, it is my proposal that employers harness the
benefits of the technology while abandoning its problems.
Consider, for example, a system that gathers data anonymously. An
employer could use machine learning to detect inappropriate or harassing
communications but gather only the department, unit, or geographic region
of the impacted workers and not the names of either alleged harassers or
victims. The reporting unit would be determined on a case-by-case basis to
ensure a large enough population to maintain anonymity of the workers
involved. The tool could thus gather data on trends in the organization,
analyze upticks in problematic interactions, and identify departments or
regions that appear to have more problematic cultures. This data can then be
used by management to allocate resources where needed, to direct trainings
214. See Crootof, supra note 116, at 243–44 (describing the problems of over-trusting in
AI).
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and other refreshers to the groups that need them, to issue expressions of
company policy, and to appoint an ombudsperson or other worker resources
to insure employees have a safe avenue for complaints. The problem is not
the ability to gather massive quantities of data. Data can, if treated
thoughtfully, be extremely useful in understanding workplace problems and
targeting solutions. As Pauline Kim has described with reference to the use
of AI to examine turnover rather than run the hiring program, “In this version
of the story, data and analytic tools are used to promote, rather than
undermine, workplace equality.”215
In fact, a number of smart companies are beginning to offer this type of
data collection and analysis. For example, tEquitable provides a third-party
ombudsperson to which employees can report complaints about all kinds of
workplace problems and offers resources to either escalate the complaint
appropriately or find independent solutions.216 On the back-end, the
company provides aggregated data to the contracting employer so it can see
the type of complaint by department or region and so the employer can take
affirmative steps to make changes where needed. tEquitable customizes socalled behavioral data by industry and company but never reveals the
identities of the parties involved in the complaints.217
The benefits of such an AI-based detecting system are innumerable. It
helps the company keep regular tabs on the workplace and identify
problematic areas, while incentivizing affirmative interventions to improve
workplace culture. Most importantly for our purposes, it creates none of the
problems of employer liability or employee vulnerability that this paper has
discussed because it maintains the anonymity of the individuals involved.218
In addition, it does not depend on a 100% accurate detection rate. If the AI
monitor misidentifies a communication as harassing when it was, in fact,
benign, the worst-case scenario is that already compliant workers get

215. Pauline Kim, Big Data And Artificial Intelligence: New Challenges For Workplace
Equality, 57 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 327–28 (2019) (describing beneficial uses of AI to
examine data about a company’s workforce to, for example, understand sources of women’s
underrepresentation).
216. See TEQUITABLE, https://www.tequitable.com/ [https://perma.cc/VRC4-KMWS] (last
visited May 20, 2021).
217. Telephone Interview with Lisa Gelobter, CEO and Co-Founder, tEQuitable (Feb. 10,
2020).
218. It is worth noting that this approach may present a problem if certain departments are
dominated by underrepresented minorities. As discussed above, if the algorithm is trained on
too narrow a universe of resources, it may create signal and bias problems, flagging benign
communications from already marginalized employees more often than others. In such a case,
it would be important for human managers to be aware of this potential problem and adjust
responses as a result. See supra text accompanying notes 121–131.
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additional training and reminders of company policy. Similarly, if the
algorithm misses a problematic interaction, it does not expose the company
to additional liability. And if the company has simultaneously worked to
create a culture of trust, it can expect that event to be reported and handled
appropriately. This approach is all upsides.
In addition, employers might consider deploying AI in the form of a
“nudge.” Promoted by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, a nudge is
essentially a simple, inexpensive, and not overly intrusive intervention and
that utilizes psychology and research on the decision-making process to
promote a specific choice that is in the interest of public welfare.219 Nudges
can take numerous forms but the simplest and least intrusive nudges “supply
simple information to individuals or impart reminders” and “may also be
called ‘deliberation nudges’ because they encourage ‘active, reflective
decisions.’”220 Sunstein refers to these simple nudges as “educative nudges”
while Ralph Hertwig and Till Grüne-Yanoff suggest the concept of “short
term boosts” and include “reminders, warnings, and information such as
nutrition labels” as examples.221 Utilizing the nudge concept, AI could be
used to monitor and flag inappropriate communications and then send an
automatic message to recipient, sender, or both. The recipient message
might say “this email has been tagged for possible harassing content. You
may want to report it. Here’s how the law defines harassment, here’s our
company policy, and here is the process for reporting . . . “The message
could include a link to make reporting easy and explain the process for
219. See Todd Haugh, Nudging Corporate Compliance, 54 Am. Bus. L. J. 683, 690–93
(2017)
Taken all together, the concept of nudging can best be encapsulated as follows:
‘Nudges are simple interventions designed to promote desirable choices--such as
compliance choices--by taking advantage of psychology . . . [including] a
growing list of mental shortcuts, cognitive biases, and psychological quirks that
subconsciously influence, and often sabotage, our decisions. Nudges are designed
to either harness or neutralize these tendencies, and help us make better decisions,
by subtly altering the decision-making process or the mental context in which the
decision is made.’
(quoting Scott Killingsworth, Behavioral Ethics: From Nudges to Norms,
BRYANCAVE.COM 1 (2017), http://ethicalsystems.org/content/behavioral-ethics-nudgesnorms [https://perma.cc/HTX2-76UY])).
220. Id. at 710.
221. Ralph Hertwig & Till Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting: Steering or
Empowering Good Decisions, 12(6) PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCH. SCI. 973, 977 (2017)
(differentiating between nudges and boosts but suggesting overlap between educative nudges
and short-term boosts); see generally CASS SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE:
GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (2016) (describing nudges, choice
architecture, and mandates).
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reporting and the response the employee should expect to receive.222 On the
flip side, the AI could also be used to trigger an automatic message to the
sender before the email is sent that says something along the lines of “This
email has been tagged for possible harassing content. Do you want to
reconsider your message? . . .” This idea has gained some attention in the
dating app context with recent reports suggesting that Tinder is
experimenting with AI monitoring messages and offering an “Are you sure
you want to send?” type of alert for possible inappropriate content.223
Alternatively, or perhaps in addition to the nudge approach, employers
could deploy AI in the form of chat bots with which complaining employees
can correspond. Researchers in England have begun to develop this
technology, “which uses a computer-controlled robot to mimic a human
interviewer, for recording and reporting workplace harassment
anonymously.”224 This bot is powered by the same technology that AI-based
harassment monitors use—natural language processing—to understand
human language. But instead of detecting and reporting it, these chatbots
interact with the victim and offer a neutral non-intimidating interface that
allows victims to come forward on their own and insures an appropriate and
effective response. The chatbot “guides the participant through an evidencebased cognitive interview . . . to get a high quality account of what
happened. . . .”225 It avoids the need for an initial conversation with a human
who might react poorly, provide his or her own commentary, or express
judgment about the victim’s report. Essentially, it “bypasses concerns about
trust, confidentiality and doubts being cast over harassment allegations.”226
The bot can offer an anonymous report to be sent to management, allow the
reporter to decline escalation of her report, or report the user’s name based
on her preference. There are still some risks attendant to the use of these
222. This option still carries the risk that an employee will be encouraged to report conduct
before it rises to the level of unlawful harassment, thereby exposing herself to lawful
retaliation under Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001) (per curiam).
See supra note 177.
223. In the dating context, Tinder is already employing AI in this way. See Nicolas Rivero,
Tinder is using AI to monitor DMs and tame the creeps, QUARTZ (May 24, 2021),
https://qz.com/2011998/tinder-is-using-ai-to-monitor-dms-and-tame-the-creeps/ [https://per
ma.cc/S2J8-YA7C]
Tinder is asking its users a question we all may want to consider before dashing
off a message on social media: ‘Are you sure you want to send?’ The dating app
announced . . . it will use an AI algorithm to scan private messages and compare
them against texts that have been reported for inappropriate language in the past.
224. Shaw and Elphick, supra note 76.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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chat bots—they can be hacked as was the experience with a Microsoftcreated tool,227 or the programming can be infected with bias leading the
chatbot to ask inappropriate questions. At worst, if it fails, the tool could
deter future reports. But it would not come with the significant problems
that AI-based harassment monitors create.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it is essential that employers
focus far more time and resources on the creation of workplace cultures that
invite respectful dissent, encourage complaints about harassment and other
forms of discrimination, take seriously and investigate properly the reports
that come in, and ensure that retaliation is understood and prohibited. There
is no magic bullet for creating this type of workplace culture. It is far more
difficult than a tech solution that promises to eliminate toxic employees, but
in the end, it is the only truly effective approach. When contemplating
employers’ impulse to turn to tech for an answer, I find an analogy to
parenting useful. If I learned that my child was being bullied in school but
had not discussed it with me because she was afraid I would punish her for
reporting (perhaps having witnessed her siblings suffer those consequences),
would I respond by installing a camera on her clothing so that I could record
and observe every moment of her day? Of course not. The obvious response
is to stop punishing my children for reporting problems and to work hard to
create a culture of trust and safety in the home so that they feel comfortable
coming to their parents with their concerns, knowing we will hear them out,
take their concerns seriously, and respond with support. The creation of
healthy workplace cultures, while possibly more complicated, is also the
obvious solution. There is no question that it is more difficult, takes more
time, and requires consistent work. There is also no question that it is the
best, most effective way to reduce the incidence of sexual harassment in the
workplace. You cannot eliminate all bad actors—you can create a culture
that encourages reporting, takes it seriously, and deals effectively with
problems that arise. That should be the ultimate goal.
B. Legal Proposals
Although the prior sections detail objections to the use of #MeTooBots
and alternative proposals for the use of AI in promoting healthy workplace
cultures, I acknowledge that this technology may be the new reality despite
its problems. In that scenario, I am compelled to direct some proposals to
Congress and the courts as judges will invariably be faced with harassment
227. Id. (discussing Microsoft’s chatbot, Tay, which was hijacked and began tweeting
sexist and racist views).
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and retaliation claims that arise from AI-detected incidents. My aim here is
to suggest legislative and doctrinal changes that will continue to protect
victims of harassment from retaliation despite the technology’s
intervention.228
The focus here must be on retaliation and the way in which courts
understand the underlying prerequisites for protection. Focusing on
“opposition conduct,” Matthew Green has proposed expanding the doctrine
to include instances in which the alleged victim of discrimination vents,
complains, or otherwise expresses his “opposition” to her treatment even if
that expression is not directed to the employer.229 Green argues that such
venting constitutes “opposing unlawful conduct” under Title VII even if she
did not intend to convey her message to her manager or any other
representative of her employer and should, nonetheless, be grounds for
protecting the worker against possible retaliation.230 While I agree with this
proposal, in the age of AI-based harassment monitors, it does not go far
enough.
If an algorithm can detect and report harassment without the victim’s
knowledge or participation, she can be exposed to retaliation for her role in
the incident without having taken any affirmative steps to oppose it. Given
this reality, and because of the way in which Title VII’s wording approaches
the problem of retaliation, there are two basic solutions. Absent
Congressional intervention, courts could expand the doctrine to include
“silent opposition.” Such an expansion would then protect those employees
who are involved in AI-detected incidents of harassment but face retaliation
before they have a chance to make their opposition known to the employer.
This option, although possible, is unlikely given Justice Alito’s strenuous
objection to this approach in his concurrence in Crawford and the current
makeup of the Court. In addition, an expansion of the doctrine to include
“silent opposition” would face significant evidentiary problems at trial. How
does one demonstrate silent opposition if there is no requirement of conduct
of any kind?
More useful in this area would be an amendment to the retaliation
provision of Title VII (and related anti-discrimination statutes) to include
“status as a victim in an incident that constitutes an unlawful employment

228. I am not proposing alterations to the “knew or should have known” standard for
employer liability in the case of AI-based harassment monitors. If employers continue to use
this technology despite its problems, the increased liability is a risk that they should endure.
229. See Green supra note 171 at 110–11.
230. Id.
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practice”231—essentially an expansion of the Participation Clause to include
participation as a victim in the incident itself and not merely in the claim,
charge, or investigation.232 This expansion would redirect courts’ focus from
the victim’s conduct (opposition or participation) to a focus on the
employer’s motivation for the retaliation.233 It should not matter if the
employer is retaliating because the employee complained or because the
employee was the victim of discrimination that someone else or something
else reported. Retaliation for one’s victimhood in a discriminatory incident
should be prohibited under the spirit of the law. While conduct was the focus
in the past, in an AI world where human reporters (or human conduct) may
be unnecessary, the law must continue to prohibit retaliation that is motivated
by involvement in the underlying incident.
CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment and its impact on workers, organizational culture,
and an entity’s productivity and bottom line are enormous problems in the
modern workplace. As a result, the growing innovations in machine learning
seem to offer a tantalizingly “easy” solution.234 Unfortunately, this approach
leads to a far more complicated reality with significant unintended and
231. My preference would actually be to amend the statute to include “participation in an
incident that was reported to be an unlawful employment practice,” because it would also
then eliminate the problems caused by the Objectively Reasonable Belief doctrine that limits
protection to those who complain of court-determined unlawful practices and would instead
allow for a good-faith standard in such cases. See supra notes 177, 222.
232. See 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–3(a).
233. In fact, the Supreme Court has focused more intensely on employer motivation in its
understanding of disparate treatment discrimination generally. In EEOC v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc., the Court looked to the employer’s motivation for refusing to hire an
applicant rather than its actual knowledge of the applicant’s need for a religious
accommodation. 575 U.S. 768, 773 (2015)
Instead, the intentional discrimination provision prohibits certain motives,
regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge. Motive and knowledge are
separate concepts. An employer who has actual knowledge of the need for an
accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if
avoiding that accommodation is not his motive. Conversely, an employer who
acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he
has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be
needed.
Here, the expansion of retaliation protection would include a focus on the employer’s
motivation for the retaliatory conduct despite the employee’s lack of opposition conduct or
the employer’s lack actual knowledge of such opposition.
234. See, e.g., de Haan, supra note 213 (proposing AI solutions to prevent sexual
harassment).
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negative consequences.
The #MeToo Movement has spotlighted both the widespread incidence
of sexual harassment and the justifiable fear of retaliation that keeps victims
from reporting it.235 In addition, the last several years have seen both an
exponential increase in the adoption of AI technology applicable to the
workplace and a mass move towards remote work and a digital workplace.
The resulting situation explains the development of #MeTooBots, AI-based
systems that aim to detect and report harassment without the need for the
human reporter. The developers (and the companies that have adopted the
technology) understand the significant costs of workplace harassment and
attempt to bypass the problems of fear and underreporting by replacing
hesitant victims with an impassive bot.
But this solution, while enticing, is a mistake for employers and
employees alike. For employers, the use of AI-based harassment monitors
opens the door to increased liability, turning a once employer-friendly
negligence standard into something akin to strict liability. For employees,
the automatic reporting of potential harassment may make the victims of
such incidents legally unprotected when (as occurs in many cases), the victim
is retaliated against after the harassment.236 It also comes with ethical costs
in the form of damage to victim agency, voice, and healing. Perhaps most
ironically, it may come with financial and organizational costs by creating a
culture of fear, distrust, and over-monitoring that can lead to employee stress,
physical and mental health impacts, and ultimately, lowered productivity.
Understanding this more complicated reality, should we abandon AIbased solutions to workplace problems? It would be foolish to make such a
recommendation given how entrenched machine-based learning tools are
becoming and the speed of technological innovation. But it is important to
recognize that use of AI is not an “easy” solution to every workplace
dilemma. And there are both valuable and dangerous uses for AI in the
workplace. The key is understanding the impact of machine learning
solutions in order to tell the difference. For example, using AI to track
workplace trends and demographic shifts or to analyze employee turnover or
promotion rates can offer vital information to management that may not have
been possible or as easily attainable without the technology. Similarly, using
AI to detect harassment and nudge the sender and/or recipient or in the form
of a chat bot to provide resources to employees or offer a neutral
nonjudgmental and impassive interface with HR can be invaluable tools that
benefit both parties in the employment relationship.
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. See supra Part III.B.2.
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However, when AI is used to replace either managerial or employee
functions that involve adjudication, assessment, or nuanced decisionmaking, the likelihood of negative, unintended consequences increases. For
example, AI that can “run your virtual meetings,” assessing employee
emotions and responses through facial recognition software and providing
both immediate feedback and a full record to review237 has multiple potential
downsides including stressful monitoring, misplaced reliance on “neutral”
technology that is actually operating under hidden biases, and creating a
massive trove of problematic data that may be relied upon for future adverse
employment decisions. Similarly, the use of AI to monitor, detect, and report
potential harassment moves the technology from valuable to dangerous.
Constant monitoring creates unique liability issues for employers, and
automatic reporting replaces all-important human discretion and the human
reporter on which harassment, discrimination, and retaliation doctrine rely.
It is, no doubt, tempting to turn to AI and its capabilities to solve the
workplace’s thorniest problems. But the realities of the law and human
nature counsel against the rush to technology in this space. In the harassment
context, the solution likely lies in the difficult work of creating a workplace
culture that condemns harassment and discrimination but that welcomes and
takes seriously the complaints of alleged victims. AI tools that help foster
such a culture are to be lauded; those that attempt to bypass or replace this
hard work should be suspect.

237. See Arielle Pardes, AI Can Run Your Meetings Now, WIRED (Nov. 24, 2020), https:
//www.wired.com/story/ai-can-run-work-meetings-now-headroom-clockwise/ [https://perma
.cc/2LQ9-HFFM] (“Headroom’s software uses emotion recognition to take the temperature
of the room periodically, and to gauge how much attention participants are paying to
whoever’s speaking. Those metrics are displayed in a window on-screen, designed mostly to
give the speaker real-time feedback that can sometimes disappear in the virtual context.”).

